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Abstract  
Small farmers are one of the hardest hit groups in the world that is affected by the negative 
consequences of a changing climate. Their absolute dependence on weather conditions makes them 
extremely vulnerable. A catastrophe can be as small as rains arriving too soon or too late in the 
season; destroying a harvest and trapping farmers into poverty. Over the last two decades, micro 
insurances have become more popular as risk management instrument and are offered to 
marginalised communities to build resilience at relatively affordable rates. Successful 
implementation of agricultural micro insurances throughout the world is still limited however. The 
country with the most experience, and that has even included these insurances in national policies, is 
India. With over three quarters of its farming population cultivating on less than 2 hectares of land 
(and thus falling in the category of small farmers) and being home to a wide range of climatic risks 
and conditions, this country is incredibly interesting and relevant to study regarding risk 
management for climate change in general and crop insurance in particular. However, crop 
insurances in India also face several challenges (such as basis risk, delays in payments and lack of 
awareness among farmers). Therefore, the following research question is central to this study: 
How can current crop insurances in India be improved to better suit the needs and wishes of 
small farmers? 
To answer this question, a literature review was conducted in combination with an in depth field 
survey in Nashik district in Maharashtra and focus group discussions in Vellore District in Tamil Nadu. 
The field survey revealed that community involvement in insurance plays an important role for 
farmers. The most extensive case of community insurance has been implemented in Tamil Nadu. To 
gain a better understanding how community insurance can then be implemented and improved, 
farmers revealed their satisfaction under this type of insurance. Not surprisingly, community 
involvement helps strengthen trust in crop insurance products, gives farmers autonomy over their 
own risk management, and increases awareness and understanding of crop insurance. While 
insurance companies in India are increasingly using advanced technology to estimate losses, this 
thesis can serve as a case study for community empowerment as the strongest weapon in climate 
change adaptation. By shedding light on small farmers under various types of insurances, it becomes 
clear which aspects of the different designs and implementation strategies are truly satisfying small 
farmers’ needs. 
Key concepts 
Climate Change • Weather shocks • Adaptation 
• Smallholder farmers • Risk management • 
Crop insurance • Vulnerability 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Context and urgency 
Global climate change is altering the earth’s ecosystem: weather patterns are changing, extreme 
weather events are becoming more frequent, and sea levels are rising. Worldwide, climate change 
has both biophysical as well as socio-economic effects that influence agricultural production (Kalisch 
et al. 2011). Due to the dependence on natural resources, agriculture is highly vulnerable to climate 
change and the resulting changing weather patterns: weather-related disasters like drought and 
floods largely outnumber geophysical disasters (Collier et al. 2009; Barrett et al. 2007). Climate risks 
for the agricultural sector include temperature shifts, erratic rainfall and droughts (Kalisch et al. 
2011). These changing environmental conditions imply that farmers need to adapt to ensure their 
livelihoods (Collier et al. 2009). However, the uncertainty of increasing climate risks makes especially 
farmers with a limited budget less likely to invest in for example buildings, improved seeds, fertilizers 
and herds, pursuing a risk averse strategy (Barrett et al. 2007).  
Agriculture plays an important role in India’s economy: it is a source of livelihood for almost 60 per 
cent of the population (Kalisch et al. 2011). The value added of agriculture to the GDP of India is 
almost 20 per cent, and 60 per cent of the land area is used for agriculture. The country has the 
largest area under wheat, rice and cotton and is the largest producer in the world of milk, pulses and 
spices (The World Bank, 2013). Small and marginal farmers can be considered the most vulnerable 
group in the agricultural sector facing climate risks. Due to limited access to formal risk management 
instruments, these farmers often apply informal instruments to prevent and cope with weather 
related risks. Examples of coping strategies in response to a weather shock are withdrawing children 
from school, reduction of nutrient intake and distress sales of assets (Barrett et al. 2007). As 
sensitivity to climate risk declines with increasing wealth it is important that risk management 
strategies in the agricultural sector focus on policies and instruments that are particularly beneficial 
for small and marginal farmers (Hertel & Rosch, 2010). Thus, risk management is of importance in 
relation to climate change in the agricultural sector, as it helps realising higher levels of socio-
economic development by providing buffers for farmers, households and communities to become 
more resilient to these risks (Someshwar, 2008). 
India’s National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture is one of the country’s eight missions under the 
National Action Plan on Climate Change. One of the four focus areas of the National Mission for 
Sustainable Agriculture is risk management, in which agricultural and weather insurance mechanisms 
play an important role (Kalisch et al. 2011). Micro-insurances are considered to be a useful tool to 
enhance risk management capacity: they could provide more economic security in times of need. 
Micro-insurances can be defined as follows (CGAP in NABARD, 2008, p.96): 
‘The protection of low income households against specific perils in exchange for premium 
payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved.’  
Thus, the main difference with regular insurance is that micro-insurances are targeting low-income 
clients with an affordable premium cover (Hochrainer et al. 2009).  India has integrated two different 
models of agricultural insurance in national policy: the Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme 
(WBCIS) and the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS). The first one consists of a weather 
index-based insurance that links the insurance to the data of weather stations in a certain area (for 
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example rainfall or temperature data). NAIS consists of an area-yield index insurance, which links the 
insurance to yield data in a certain area (for example through historic yield data of that particular 
area). Although the agricultural micro insurance market in India is considerable (especially in 
comparison to other developing countries), there is still a large group of farmers that is not reached, 
or not aware of the insurance products. Therefore, it is important to understand agricultural micro 
insurances in the broader context of climate risk management from the perspective of the farmers 
themselves. Hence, the following objective and research questions are central to this research: 
 
The following definitions will be used in this thesis. Marginal farmers are those who cultivate less 
than one hectare of land (2.5 acres), whereas farmers who cultivate between one and two hectares 
of land (2.5-5 acres) are considered small farmers (FAO, 2010). In India, farmers cultivating less than 
two hectares of land make up 80 per cent of the farming population (FAO, 2010). In this thesis we 
will thus refer to small farmers, as those who cultivate up to two hectares of land. 
1.2 Scientific relevance 
Although there is a wide range of literature on micro insurances, the implementation of the 
instrument in developing countries is rather recent. As India can be perceived as one of the countries 
with the largest application of agricultural micro insurances, including in national policies, it is 
interesting to conduct research in this country. By including farmer’s motivations and their 
experienced benefits, the data will contribute as a case study of agricultural micro insurances as well 
as be used as input for further research or improvement of risk management instruments. It will also 
provide a broader perspective towards agricultural micro insurances in India, by including both 
insured and non-insured farmers in different parts of the country. The study will give insight in 
farmer understanding, awareness and satisfaction of agricultural micro insurance as a risk 
management instrument trying to shield farmers against the negative consequences of climate 
change. 
1.3 Social relevance 
Small farmers are the most vulnerable group in the agricultural sector. The majority of these farmers 
are subsistence farmers and only sell their products if they have enough excess harvest beyond their 
households basic needs. This also implies that a failed harvest or a low yield due to changing weather 
patterns can have disastrous consequences for this particular group. In the future, dry spells will 
Main objective: 
To understand the merits, demerits and find points for improvement of existing crop 
insurances in India 
 
Central research question: 
How can current crop insurances in India be improved to better suit the needs and 
wishes of small farmers? 
 
Sub questions: 
1. What kind of crop insurance systems do farmers in India use and why is there a 
difference in uptake? 
2. Does current crop insurance meet the needs and wishes of small farmers? 
3. What are the merits and demerits of current crop insurance? 
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become longer, extreme precipitation will increase and weather events will intensify. This implies 
that small farmers are facing a poverty trap they cannot escape. Risk management instruments are 
therefore crucial to stabilise their income. This research will give insight in how risk management for 
these farmers can be improved, which could lead to improving of (government and insurance) 
policies and can provide a small step into improving the livelihoods of small farmers in India and 
hopefully provides a useful case study for other developing countries as well. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
Part 1: Literature review 
Chapter 2 introduces the main theoretical concepts central to this research: the sustainable 
livelihoods framework, risk management, and concepts related to crop insurance (such as moral 
hazard, risk pooling, and adverse selection). The chapter also introduces the conceptual framework 
of the thesis in section 2.2. Chapter 3 explains risk management in general and gives an overview of 
risk management strategies applied by small farmers. Chapter 4.1 provides an overview of 
agricultural micro insurance around the world. Section 3.3 then explains how crop insurance in India 
have evolved through the years. Chapter 5 provides a literature review of two types of current crop 
insurance in India: area-yield and weather index based insurances. The main opportunities, 
challenges, and scope for improvement found in academic literature are revealed and were used as 
input for the field survey. 
 
Part 2: Methodology & research area 
Chapter 6 gives an overview of the research question, the research objective, and the methods used. 
It explains how the literature review is conducted and gives insight in the data analysis, using sub 
objectives and sub research questions, as well as hypotheses and variables. A combination of 
qualitative and quantitative data is used, which both ask for a different analytical approach. Chapter 
7 shows the research areas, and the specific vulnerabilities farmers experience in this part of the 
country. 
Part 3: Results: case study 1 & case study 2 
Case study 1 covers chapter 8-11: 
 Chapter 8 gives the regional profile of Maharashtra and Nashik district. After which chapter 9 
explains crop insurances available in Maharashtra in more detail and looks at the differences 
between the three categories of farmers used for the field study. Chapter 10 examines the risks these 
farmers face and their perception of these risks, as well as looking different aspects of crop insurance 
(loss assessment, premium, the role of insurance companies) and the importance farmers give to 
these aspects. Chapter 11 both shows the rating farmers give to aspects of crop insurance and shows 
the SWOT analysis that was based on the literature review and field survey combined. 
 
Case study 2 covers chapter 12-14:  
Chapter 12 gives the regional profile of Tamil Nadu, as well as giving insight in the weather pattern in 
Vellore district and the main crops grown. Chapter 13 explain the concept of community insurance 
and why this particular design was chosen by DHAN Foundation. Chapter 14 then uses the data 
gathered in FGDs to reveal the satisfaction levels on different aspects of the insurance of farmers in 
the area. 
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Part 4: Discussion, conclusion and recommendations 
The final part consist of the discussion in chapter 15, which discusses the relevance of the thesis 
results in the broader climate change debate. The final chapter 16 gives the conclusion and the policy 
and research recommendations of this thesis. 
 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach 
This research will built on the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, which takes a holistic approach 
towards development, especially focused on rural people (IFAD, 2013). This research will be 
approached from the sustainable livelihood definition of Chambers and Conway (1991, p.6): 
‘A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and 
activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with 
and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and 
provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes 
net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long 
term.’  
The focus of this research is the ability of smallholder farmers to cope with weather-related shocks 
and stresses that will only be increasing due to climate change. The production risks arising from 
climate change that smallholder farmers are facing cannot be completely eliminated but they can be 
reduced and managed.  
A holistic approach is necessary, as for small and marginal farmers the entire household works 
together to provide for income. And often this is not limited to one crop (intercropping is very 
common) and also not only limited to agriculture, but also non-agricultural on-farm labour (e.g. 
Agarbatti making and Beedi rolling) and off-farm labour (agricultural, non-agricultural and in 
government projects). How the rural households cope depends on their context: for example the 
shocks they face (these could be weather shocks) and their cultural background (in some villages 
migrant labour is very common, while in other places it is not very acceptable). The centre of the 
framework are the people, which suits the current study very well, as the perspective of the farmers 
is considered the most important (and often forgotten) aspect of improving smallholder risk 
management. It is very important to bear in mind that the adaptive capacity of households and 
individuals is dependent on various factors. When a small or marginal farmer withdraws its children 
from school for example, this could be due to a failed crop, which leads to not being able to pay off a 
loan, and therefore not being able to pay school fees anymore, and/ or needing the children to go to 
work instead of school to contribute to the household income. The Sustainable Livelihoods 
Framework portrays these links in a simplified manner, but nonetheless gives an important overview 
of the complexity of relations between context and livelihoods of rural people (in this case small and 
marginal farmers and their household). The focus for this research will be on the livelihood outcomes 
and strategies (the right side of the model), whereas the left side will function as background 
knowledge in comparing different farmers. 
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Figure 2.2: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the conceptual framework of the current research, based on the Sustainable 
Livelihoods Framework. The first three pillars (vulnerability context, livelihood assets, and structures 
and processes) function as background information on the area, the farmers, and the policies and 
insurance schemes that are in place. The awareness farmers have of crop insurance and agriculture 
in general is used to distinguish understanding farmers within both insured and non-insured groups 
of farmers. Categorisation of farmers is of importance as it later on influences the choices they make 
for their risk management strategy, and is expected to differ between socio-economic position of the 
Figure 2.1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Retrieved from DFID, 1999) 
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farmers. The fourth pillar (livelihood strategies) also plays an important role in the research. 
Although the main risk management instrument under study is crop insurance, it is important to 
place this tool within the formal and informal risk strategies farmers apply to determine the role of 
insurance in the overall risk management of these farmers. The fifth pillar (livelihood outcomes) 
provides insight into the context of risk management strategies among various farmers.  
 
3. Agricultural risk management 
3.1 Risk management explained 
Risk management is of importance in relation to climate change in the agricultural sector, as it helps 
realising higher levels of socio-economic development by providing buffers for farmers and helps 
households and communities to become more resilient to these risks (Someshwar, 2008). When 
looking at the people affected, two types of risk can be distinguished: idiosyncratic risk and covariate 
risk. Idiosyncratic risk is specific to a household whereas a covariate risk affects all members of a 
community or region (e.g. droughts) (NABARD, 2008).  In both situations it is uncertainty that can 
lead to a risk situation with negative consequences (Zweifel & Eisen, 2012, pp.1-2). Although 
households often have various ways of insuring themselves against idiosyncratic risks (e.g. borrowing 
from neighbours or family members), in case of covariate risks, the options of informal insurance are 
more limited as the entire region is affected (Hochrainer et al. 2009). With regards to outcome, there 
are also two types of risk: speculative risk and pure risk. Outcomes of the former type of risk can 
produce are: loss, no loss/no gain and gain, whereas the latter type of risk can only result in loss or 
no loss (AICPA, 2004).  Weather shocks fall under the latter category of risks. One tool of managing 
pure risks is insurance (Government of India, 2007).   
 
Especially for small farmers without any buffer to fall back on, these risks can create poverty traps. In 
relation to poverty traps, three types of climate and weather risk management categories can be 
distinguished (Barrett et al. 2007; see also figure 3.1):  
 Safety nets for emergency humanitarian response: blocking people falling below threshold A.  
 Cargo net interventions and facilitating exit from chronic poverty: stimulating upward 
movement from point 1 to point 2, lifting people over the threshold B. 
 Safety nets for preventing collapse into a poverty trap (or productive safety nets): blocking 
downwards movement from point 2 lower than threshold B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Three types of climate and weather risk management 
(Retrieved from Barrett et al. 2007, p.25) 
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Agricultural micro insurances fall under the third category of risk management, as they provide a 
safety net on the longer term, preventing small and marginal farmers from falling into poverty. Crop 
insurances can be considered as formal risk management instrument. The difference between formal 
and informal risk management instruments is as follows (according to The World Bank, 2001, p.140):    
 Informal strategies are defined as  
“..arrangements that involve individuals or households or such groups as communities or 
villages..” 
 Formal arrangements are defined as:  
“..market-based activities and publicly provided mechanisms..” 
A further distinction can be made between ex ante and ex post risk management strategies. This 
classification focuses on the point in time in which the reaction to risk takes place: ex ante: prior to 
the occurrence of the potential risk; ex post: after the event has occurred . 
3.2 Risk management strategies applied by small farmers 
Based on talking to farmers1 about their risk management strategies, both informal and formal 
strategies are distinguished. See table 3.1 for an overview of formal and informal, ex post and ex 
ante risk management strategies. 
3.2.1 Informal risk management strategies 
Ex-ante informal strategies are characterised by diversification of income sources and choice of 
agricultural production strategy. These include: 
 Diversification of income 
In addition to their main crop cultivation, majority of the farmers supplement their income 
from additional income from livestock rearing, migrant labour abroad (e.g. Quwait, 
Singapore, Malaysia) and local labour (e.g. bakery, electrician). The farmers are also involved 
in incense stick making, bidi (cigarette) making and matchbox making (work that is 
conducted on the farm) alongside crop cultivation . 
 Crop diversification  
Farmers have diversified their arable land to grow other crops alongside their main crop (e.g. 
ragi, horse gram, cotton, paddy, horticulture, mushrooms, tomatoes, brinjal, grapes, garden 
bean). 
 Diversification towards plantation crops  
Some relatively bigger farmers have diversified their arable land towards plantation crops 
(such as teak wood, mango, banana, coconut). 
 Inter-cropping  
Farmers in the study area are intercropping groundnut cultivation with other crops (e.g. 
green gram, black gram, red gram, fodder sorghum, little millet, field bean). 
 Adoption of advanced cropping technique   
Some of the advanced cropping techniques used by farmers are: compost heap, gypsum and 
complex (if there is moisture in the soil) and potassium. 
 Groundwater irrigation  
Although majority of small farmers depend on rain for, some farmers use and have access to 
tube wells and bore wells to irrigate their land. 
                                                          
1
 300 groundnut farmers in Tamil Nadu in focus group discussions, see methods section 6.2.3 
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Ex-post informal strategies are characterized typically by reducing consumption pattern, deferring/ 
low key social and family function, sale of assets, mutual aid or reallocation of labour resources to 
off-farm or on-farm labour activities. Some of these on-farm and off-farm risk mitigation practices 
are effective for counterbalancing the consequences of events affecting only some members of the 
community, it does not work well in cases of covariate income shocks (Hazell, 1992).  
3.2.2 Formal risk management strategies 
Government action plays an important role in agricultural risk management both ex-ante and ex-
post. In the area2 where farmers were asked about their risk management strategies, small farmers 
have access to services provided by a local NGO (DHAN Foundation). The formal risk management 
strategies farmers apply include: 
 Diversification of income  
Farmers are supplementing their income by taking part in a government provided rural 
employment scheme. In 2005, the central government formulated the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). MGNREGA provides employment to those who 
demand it: at least 100 days in a financial year of guaranteed unskilled wage employment for 
adult members of rural households to provide in their livelihood (Ministry of Rural 
Development, 2012) 
 Supply of inputs  
The local NGO provides to its members quality red gram and groundnut seeds at appropriate 
time as well as gypsum at market rate. Supply of quality agricultural inputs help reduce risk 
of procuring fake or low-quality inputs from the market. 
 Risk pooling  
The government of India insures groundnut farmers by its NAIS scheme while DHAN 
Foundation pools risks by insuring their members through its mutual crop insurance scheme. 
 Infrastructure & advanced cropping techniques  
The local NGO promotes tank fed irrigation, and land  levelling and silt application amongst 
its farmers as advanced cropping techniques. 
 
Ex-post formal strategies include government provided social assistance schemes (e.g. rice, 
education, health care). In addition, farmers can avail credit from government or DHAN Foundation. 
                                                          
2
 Vellore district, Tamil Nadu 
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Table 3.1: Risk management strategies small farmers (based on Vellore district, Tamil Nadu) 
 Informal Mechanisms Formal Mechanisms 
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Credit (at 18% interest 
rate: market rate is 12%, 6 
% for organisation flows 
back to SHG) 
Social Assistance 
1) Rice scheme 
16kg rice per month (3 
member family) 
20kg Rice per month 
(more than 3 member 
family) 
35 kg Rice per month 
(BPL families) 
2) 2 Sari/Dhoti per year 
3) Free Education in 
Government Schools, 
4) Free Treatment in 
Government Hospital 
D
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Migrant labour abroad -Kuwait, Muscat, 
Singapore, Malaysia 
Migrant Labour Locally(Mason work, 
bakery, electrician, hotel etc)-Chennai, 
Bangalore 
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3.3 The concept of insurance explained 
In general, insurance consists of a contract (‘insurance policy’) between an individual or organisation 
(the insured) and an insurance company (the insurer).  In exchange for bearing the risk, the insured is 
obliged to pay a risk premium to the insurance company. Risks of different clients are then pooled; a 
claim made to the insurer will be paid from this pool: hence, this is called risk pooling. If the insurer 
wants to protect itself against not being able to pay all the claims made from the pool (for example in 
case of a drought when a lot of people will make a claim at the same time), the insurer can take on 
an insurance for the insurance, which is then called reinsurance. Adverse selection occurs when 
potential insured clients hide information about their risk from insurers. This information asymmetry 
then leads to false assessments and premia and in the end failing of the insurance system (Barrett et 
al. 2007). Moral hazard occurs when insured clients resort to actions that increase their exposure to 
the risk they have insurance for, thus exceeding the risk exposure that was estimated when the 
premium was established, leaving the insurer with a higher risk (Barrett et al. 2007; Davies et 
al.2009). 
The poor not only face more risk than others, it is often their low capacity to cope with risks that 
makes them extra vulnerable (NABARD, 2008). Micro-insurances can therefore provide a useful tool 
to enhance risk management capacity: it provides more economic security in times of need. Micro-
insurances can be defined as follows (CGAP in NABARD, 2008, p.96): 
‘The protection of low income households against specific perils in exchange for premium 
payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved.’  
Thus, the main difference with regular insurance is that micro-insurances are targeting low-income 
clients against an affordable premium cover (Hochrainer et al. 2009).  
 
The lack of formal, risk transfer instruments makes the poor more vulnerable and averse to making 
risky and uncertain investment decisions. By stabilising farmer income and therewith increasing risk 
taking capability, agricultural insurance facilitates adoption of higher yielding technologies and 
intensification of production. Also, insurance serves as a substitute for physical collateral and reduces 
credit default risk to financial intermediaries financing agricultural production. 
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4. Scope for crop insurance around the world  
4.1 Agricultural insurance around the world 
To provide insight in micro-insurances around the globe, several case studies are presented below. 
These cases are of insurances in developing or transition countries, as this is most relevant to the 
current research, and gives an overview of the benefits and challenges of micro-insurances as they 
are experienced in practice. In a lot of developing countries, crop insurance for smallholder farmers 
are solely based on a small pilot study and very few (academic) literature can be found. This also 
implies that although the cases below are selected on the basis of their relevance and on the basis of  
including a diverse range of cases, the amount of literature found did play a role in selection of case 
studies. 
4.1.1 Credit & rainfall index insurance: Malawi 
In 2005, an index-based insurance for smallholder groundnut farmers was introduced (Meze-
Hausken et al. 2009).  The loan package was provided to groups of farmers that are organised 
through the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi (NASFAM) by the banks 
Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM) and Malawi Rural Finance Corporation (MRFC) and 
the umbrella organisation of nine insurance companies Insurance Association of Malawi (IAM) 
(Hochrainer et al. 2009; Mahul & Stutley, 2010). Technical assistance for the scheme was provided by 
the World Bank (WB) and the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) (Hochrainer et al. 2009). 
The trigger is based on rainfall data (or a water requirement satisfaction index), which uses the 
rainfall over a 130-days growing period with individual weight to 10-days rainfall (decadal) periods 
(Meze-Hausken et al. 2009). In the scheme, the farmers take-up a loan with a higher premium rate to 
include the insurance: in case of drought (below the rainfall trigger) the farmer only pays a fraction of 
the loan due and the insurer pays the rest directly to the bank (Hochrainer et al. 2009).  This means 
that the bank has the assurance that the loan will be paid off, and is more likely to provide a loan to 
low-income farmers than would be the case without the insurance (Hochrainer et al. 2009). To 
minimise the basis risk, robust groundnut development data were used to let the pay-out trigger 
match the actual loss as much as possible (Meze-Hausken et al. 2009). In 2007 the insurance scheme 
was extended to also include Tobacco farmers (Mahul & Stutley, 2010).  In one of the conclusions in 
their study on the Malawi scheme, Meze-Hausken et al. (2009) argue that pooling together of 
insurance schemes and sites within a country could result in significant savings in capital 
requirement. 
4.1.2 Disaster index (re-)insurance: Mexico 
In Mexico, the federal governments provide funds to local governments in case of disaster, as part of 
the National Fund for Natural Disasters (FONDEN) that was created in 1995 (González, 2009). As part 
of this programme, the Fund to Assist Rural Populations Affected by Weather Contingencies (PACC) 
was put into place in 2003 to assist smallholder farmers with weather-related shocks: smallholder 
farmers are assisted in case of extreme weather events through a 70 per cent contribution of the 
federal government and a 30 per cent contribution of the local government (González, 2009). 
However, uncertainty about these events makes it difficult to predict when smallholder farmers will 
need the assistance, which in some years has led to relocating of the funds to other programmes 
(González, 2009). In response to this uncertainty, the national (state-owned) insurance institution 
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AGROASEMEX (national reinsurance company) has created Catastrophic Agricultural Insurance (CAI) 
for smallholder farmers affected by adverse weather conditions (Mahul & Stutley, 2010; González, 
2009). There are two triggers for pay-out: excess rainfall (corn, sorghum) and drought (corn, bean, 
barley, sorghum) (Hazell et al. 2010). The insurance functions as reinsurance mechanism, in which 
the federal and local governments are the one buying the insurance and in case of drought or excess 
rainfall can pay disaster relief to affected farmers, without increasing the fund’s budget (González, 
2009). Farmers are, on average, reinvesting 70 per cent of the pay-out improving their production 
(Hazell et al. 2010). 
Basis risk has occurred on a couple of occasions, both where pay-out was made without damage and 
where farmers were affected but no pay-out was available (Hazell et al. 2010).  Decreasing this risk 
would imply that more infrastructure is necessary (having farmers within the 10-20km range of 
weather station), but also brings along costs for governments beyond their budgets (Hazell et al. 
2010). Hazell et al. (2010) suggest the cooperation with a private company (Fundación PRODUCE) 
that already has more weather stations in place. Although these stations lack historical data, 
AGROASEMEX has developed reanalysis techniques to simulate series of weather variables (into 
regular patterns). Often, farmers are also unaware that the aid they are receiving is part of an index 
insurance programme as opposed to the disaster relief out of tax revenues (Hazell et al 2010). On the 
positive side, the index insurance programme has been less costly for governments than paying 
disaster relief directly to farmers (Hazell et al. 2010). 
4.1.3 Rainfall and temperature index insurance: Ukraine 
In Ukraine, a hybrid of multi-peril crop insurance and area-yield index insurance has been introduced 
in 2001 (Hazell et al. 2010). In 2005, a pilot was launched to introduce rainfall and temperature index 
insurance. A partnership was formed consisting of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
Agribusiness Development Project and World Bank Commodity Risk Management Group (CRMG) and 
the only insurance company willing and suitable to cooperate (Hazell et al. 2010; Shynkarenko, 
2007). One of the main pitfalls of the pilot programme was the lack of government support. As the 
government did support (50 % of the premium) the hybrid crop insurance of area-yield and multi-
peril crop insurance, insurance companies lacked the incentive to implement a weather index-based 
insurance, although these insurance could be more effective (Shynkarenko, 2007). Another weakness 
was the fact that agricultural insurance is not common in Ukraine (banks prefer to use collateral to 
secure loans instead of insurances) in combination with the short and rather poor marketing 
campaign (Hazell et al. 2010; Shynkarenko, 2007). There was a lack of experience and a lack of 
cooperation with farmers, which resulted in only 2 farmers willing to sign a rainfall index insurance 
contract. On top of this, infrastructure for weather data is insufficient (distance between weather 
stations are more than 50 km) and the availability of weather data is restricted by the high costs to 
access it (Hazell et al. 2010). 
4.1.4 Area-yield index insurance: Brazil 
The state government in Brazil implemented a programme for seed-swapping in the late 1980s: 
Programa Troca-Troca de Sementes (PTTS). The programme aims at smallholder farmers of which the 
majority of (total family) income comes from agriculture (>70 per cent), and provides these farmers 
with certified maize seeds they pay at the end of the harvest. As extreme weather events were 
threatening the existence of PTTS, an area-yield index insurance was included in the programme in 
Rio Grande do Sul State in 2001, under the name of Municipalized Risk Group (GRM) (Hazell et al. 
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2010). The insurance is only for PTTS farmers and pay-out is triggered when the yield deviation of the 
average yield in an area is more than 20 per cent (Hazell et al. 2010). Under the coordination of 
AgroBrasil Seguros a partnership was formed with the State’s Department of Agriculture and Supply 
(SAA), the State Bank of Rio Grande do Sul (Banrisul) and the State Data-Processing Company 
(PROCERGS) (Hazell et al. 2010). 
The main constraint of the programme is its high dependency on government, the state for funding 
(reducing the sustainability of the programme) and the national government for pay-outs (which 
results in  a delay of an entire harvest crop season) (Hazell et al. 2010). The dependence on the 
government subsidies also resulted in the programme not being renewed after 2008 (Mahul & 
Stutley, 2010; The World Bank, 2010).  One of the strong points of the programme in Brazil was its 
extensive education and marketing efforts: because of the voluntary basis of the insurance, 45 
people worked on marketing activities, and a cartoon booklet was produced to educate farmers to 
understand the product (Hazell et al. 2010). Technology was also used to improve the insurance data. 
A software programme ‘ AgroNet’  was developed that cross-checks farmers’ requests for seed with 
data of the municipality (for example the sum insured and area-yield data of a the farmers’ 
municipality); a daily report is distributed to Agrobrasil, insurers, reinsurers and the sales team on 
the ground (Hazell et al.2010). 
4.1.5 Failed attempt: Morocco 
In Morocco, the government launched a yield insurance scheme in 1995: Programme Secheresse (or 
Drought Programme), with revisions made to the scheme in 1999 an area-yield based mechanisms 
was included for the lowest of three different coverage levels (the three different levels are: 1000, 
2000, 3000 Moroccan Dirhams (MAD) per hectare) (Stoppa & Hess, 2003). For the first level (of 1000 
MAD/ha), payment is triggered on the basis of area-yield data, whereas the two other levels (2000 
MAD/ha and 3000 MAD/ha) require individual farm assessment (Stoppa & Hess, 2003). An official 
ministerial drought declaration is needed for all levels, and the yield-loss for the first level this is 
based on realised area yield data for a rural commune (Skees et al., 2001). The programme is 
subsidised by the government with a premium subsidy of 50 per cent (Mahul & Stutley, 2010). 
However, the programme suffered from different problems, including high costs, loss adjustment, 
adverse selection, moral hazard and fraud (Skees et al.2007). Therefore, in the beginning of the 
2000s, The World Bank (in cooperation with the Moroccan government) attempted to introduce 
rainfall index insurances in Morocco and conducted an elaborate study (Skees et al., 2001; Skees et 
al. 2007). The project failed (close to implementation) and the product was not implemented. 
Lybbert et al. (2010, p.178) suggest this was in part because ‘the recent downward trend in rainfall 
hinted at a troubling non-stationarity in precipitation data.’ Based on this information, the insurance 
company proposed a high premium which could not be passed on to the clients (Skees et al. 2007). 
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Table 4.1: Overview of index insurance case studies around the world 
Country Type of 
insurance 
Sinc
e  
Delivered by Amount 
insured 
Role of government Re-
insuranc
e 
Linked to 
credit 
Malawi Rainfall 
index 
insurance 
2005 Banks: OIBM & 
MRFC 
 
Insurer: IAM 
 
Farmers: 
NASFAM 
 
TA: WB & SECO 
2005: 900 
farmers 
US$ 35,000 
 
2006: 3000 
farmers US$ 
110,000
3
 
None (no subsidy or 
government 
support) 
No Compulsor
y for 
smallholde
r farmer 
taking loan 
Mexico Disaster 
index 
insurance 
2003 Disaster relief: 
federal & local 
government 
 
Reinsurer: 
AGROASEMEX 
2006: Sum 
insured  
US$131.9 
million
4
 
 
2007: 
650,000 
farmers
5
 
 
2008: 
800,000 
farmers
6
 
Agricultural 
reinsurance through 
AGROASEMEX 
 
Catastrophe 
insurance protection 
for smallholder 
farmers: 100% 
subsidised 
Yes No 
Ukraine Rainfall 
and 
temperat
ure index 
insurance 
2005 Insurer: Credo-
Classic 
 
Partnership 
with: IFC & 
CRMG 
2005: 2 
farmers 
None (only subsidy 
support for the 
other agricultural 
insurance) 
No No 
Brazil Area-yield 
index 
insurance 
2001 
 
Insurer: 
PROAGRO 
 
Partnership: 
SAA, Banrisul, 
PROCERGS, 
AgroBrasil 
Seguros 
2007: 26,071 
farmers 
 
2008: 14,893 
farmers
7
 
Subsidised and 
initiated by 
government 
(Subsidy: 90% of 
premium) 
Yes No 
 
4.2 History of crop insurance in India 
India can be perceived as the birthplace of weather index based insurance (and particularly a 
frontrunner among developing countries), considering that as early as 1920 there was already a 
proposal for agricultural insurances done by Chakravarti (Clarke et al. 2012). He emphasised the need 
for a package of insurances (including buildings, cattle, granaries, and agricultural implements) and  
proposes a crop insurance scheme based on a rainfall deficits throughout India (Mishra, 1995).  This 
scheme was based on payments in case rainfall during a season was less than a given threshold 
                                                          
3
 Hochrainer et al. 2009, p.237 
4
 González, 2009, p.2 
5
 Hazell et al. 2010 
6
 Hazell et al. 2010 
7
 Uptake increased after bad crop years with large amounts of pay-out, and decreased in good crop years (without pay-out) 
(Hazell et al.2010) 
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(Clarke et al. 2012). Although Chakravarti’s plan was never implemented, it still serves as the basis of 
crop insurance in India today. In 1947 (the year of independence) the need for crop insurance in 
India was also recognised by the government (Singh, 2004). In 1947-1948 a commission was set up to 
research the possibilities of crop insurance. One of the main questions that needed to be addressed 
was how to assess loss: either a Homogeneous Area Approach or an Individual Approach (Singh, 
2010). The first one assesses loss on the basis of the yield for an entire area, whereas the latter 
assesses loss on the basis of a farmer’s own yield and loss experience (and pays indemnities 
accordingly) (Singh, 2010).  
 
In 1965 the national government introduced a crop insurance bill, which it circulated to state 
governments for their views on it. However, the bill was rejected by all state governments on the 
ground that the financial obligations were considered to be too high (Singh, 2010). This resulted in 
further investigation in the administrative, economic and financial implications of various crop 
insurance types (Singh, 2010). Different experiments with crop insurances started from then onwards 
(AICI, s.a.). The main milestones in crop insurance in India over the years are: 
 
 1972-1978: Individual farm based crop insurance experiments 
From 1972 onwards, several experiments with crop insurance started. The insurance was on 
an individual base, but all experiments suffered financial losses (AICI, s.a.). In total 3110 
farmers were insured under the schemes, paying INR 454.000 in premiums in total. However, 
the total claim amount far exceeded this number: INR 3.79 million (GIZ, 2013). 
 
 1979- 1984: Pilot Crop Insurance Scheme (PCIS) 
In 1979 the General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC) started operated the PCIS in 13 
states of India. Insurance participation was for loanee farmers and on a voluntary base 
covering cereals, millets, oilseeds, cotton, potato, gram and barley (AICI, s.a. ). The scheme 
was based on an area approach and covered a total of 627.000 farmers, paying a total of INR 
19.695.000 against a claim amount of INR 15.705.000 (Singh, 2010). The risk was shared on a 
2:1 basis between GIC and state governments, and a subsidy (provided by the state 
governments) of 50 per cent of the premium amount was available for small and marginal 
farmers (GIZ, 2013). 
 
 1985-1999:Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS)  
In 1985 the national government introduced CCIS as a replacement of PCIS. State 
governments could choose to either opt in or out of the insurance scheme (Singh, 2010). 
The indemnity payments were based on a homogeneous area approach using  Crop Cutting 
Experiments (CCE) to determine yield. However, most states were not able to conduct the 
required 16 CCE per area, and pooled together the yields of different areas with the same 
conditions (such as cropping pattern, climate, soil, et cetera) (Singh, 2004). 
 
 1999: National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) 
As successor of the CCIS, the NAIS was introduced by the national government in 1999. 
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Again, states can choose whether or not to participate in NAIS. If a state participates, 
insurance for food crops, oilseeds, and selected commercial crops is mandatory for farmers 
borrowing an agricultural loan, and voluntary for non-borrowing farmers (Clarke et al. 2012).  
The insurance is written against the average yield of a certain region or district, and when the 
yield in this region falls below a certain threshold, payments are made (Hazell, 2001). Claims 
beyond 100 per cent of the premiums collected are shared between national and state basis, 
each baring half of this risk (Agricultural Finance Corporation Ltd, 2012). See table 4.2 for 
NAIS coverage in the seasons 2007-08 to 2009-10. 
 
Table 4.2: Coverage of NAIS in India 
Crops Area  
Covered 
(%) 
Claims/ 
Premium  
ratio 
Premium/Sum  
assured (%) 
Claims/Sum  
assured (%) 
Farmers  
Benefited/ 
Farmers  
Covered  
(%) 
Sum  
assured as  
% of  
Value of  
Crop  
Output 
2007-08 
Paddy 18.21 3.87 2.43 9.41 15.55 9.81 
Wheat 13.20 5.96 1.51 9.00 28.01 17.43 
Groundnut 51.59 0.19 3.47 0.66 2.52 4.38 
Potato 31.08 0.89 4.61 4.09 15.77 10.75 
Cotton 3.77 0.03 7.61 0.24 0.80 69.00 
2008-09 
Paddy 14.91 5.11 2.37 12.14 25.22 9.88 
Wheat 13.99 3.19 1.52 4.83 16.84 13.83 
Groundnut 52.98 9.06 3.47 31.45 53.26 3.23 
Potato 21.16 4.35 7.39 32.17 78.87 6.60 
Cotton 4.99 0.10 10.22 0.98 6.77 49.20 
2009-10 
Paddy 26.02 3.79 2.47 9.36 31.73 5.12 
Wheat 12.30 1.39 1.50 2.08 16.41 17.00 
Groundnut 69.88 6.99 3.48 24.36 59.90 1.87 
Potato 13.87 0.13 7.67 1.00 3.93 8.10 
Cotton 5.53 0.58 7.28 4.20 15.04 27.08 
(Retrieved from: National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research (NCAP), 2011, p.13)  
 
 2003: First weather index insurance  
The first weather insurance product was introduced in India in 2003 by a private insurance 
company (ICICI-Lombard) (Clarke et al. 2012). This project started with a small pilot in Andhra 
Pradesh and was launched more broadly in 2005 (Francisco, 2008; Davies et al. 2009). Two 
other companies followed ICICI Lombard: IFFCO-Tokyo (private) and the Agricultural 
Insurance Company of India (AICI) (public) (Skees et al. 2007). 
 
 2007: Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) 
The Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) is the pilot scheme that was launched 
by the Indian national government in 2007. The introduction of a new scheme expanded the 
choice for states: not only could they opt in or out of NAIS, they now were offered the option 
to make a choice between NAIS and WBCIS (Clarke et al. 2012). In the agricultural year 2010-
2011 the WBCIS policies included over 9 million farmers covering risk valued at 3.17 billion 
US dollars and with a total premium value of 258 million US dollars (Clarke et al. 2012). Pay-
out is made when rainfall falls below (drought) or above (excess rainfall) a certain threshold 
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(Angove & Tande, 2011). See table 4.3 for an overview of the development of WBCIS in India 
from 2003 onwards. 
 
Table 4.3: Weather-based index insurance in India (Retrieved from Clarke et al. 2012) 
Agricultural 
year 
Farmers 
insured 
Sum 
Insured 
(USD 
millions) 
Commercial 
premium 
volume (USD 
millions) 
Claims paid 
(USD millions) 
Claim payments as 
multiple of 
commercial 
premiums 
2003-04 1,000  <0.1 <0.1²  
2004-05 11,300  0.2 0.1²  
2005-06 112,500  1.6 0.2²  
2006-07 181,900  1.6 1.0²  
2007-08³ 678,425 398 33.1 23.9 72% 
2008-09³ 375,100 208 18.6 14.2 77% 
2009-10³ 2,278,407 1,093 99.9 62.0 62% 
2010-11³ 9,278,000 3,174 258.9 125.0 48% 
   
 
 
 
 2010: Modified National Agriculture Insurance Scheme (mNAIS) 
In 2004, the Joint Working Group and the World Bank proposed modifications to NAIS to 
overcome the main weaknesses, these modifications included: to change the governments 
financial liability into up-front subsidy on premiums, reducing the unit size to village level, 
and early part payment to farmers based on weather indices (The World Bank, 2011). On the 
basis of this study, modifications were incorporated in the NAIS scheme in 2010 (Mahul et al. 
2012). 
Note:  
1. Commercial premium includes both farmer premium and government premium subsidies 
2. Kharif season only 
3. WBCIS only 
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5. Current crop insurance in India: a literature review 
To gain a better understanding of existing crop insurances in India and find the caveats in scientific 
knowledge, a literature review was conducted. The review is intended to give a broad overview of 
the literature on existing crop insurances in India and will be used as building block for the field 
research for the current study. 
There is a broad range of studies, varying from peer-reviewed academic articles to policy papers, and 
ranging from micro field studies to macro (country-level) analyses. The content and opinions 
expressed in these studies vary widely, from very positive towards crop insurances to more critical 
stances. Therefore the current study will focus on the lessons learned, as this would be useful for the 
upcoming field work. Refer to appendix 2 for the extended table of the review of literature using four 
categories of analysis (objective, main observations, conclusions, scope for future research). 
The main observations may be classified as challenges and opportunities of existing crop insurance in 
India. To compare the results of the studies on the different types of insurances, the two main 
existing agricultural insurance types in India were chosen to be analysed: weather index insurance 
and area-yield insurance (see table 5.1. for a concise overview of the comparison). There are several 
studies (e.g. Cappiello et al.2012; Nair, 2010; Rao, 2010; Lilleor et al. 2005) that evaluate NAIS 
insurance and propose weather index Insurance as more effective alternative for smallholder 
farmers. However, there are also studies (e.g. Rao, 2010; Zant, 2008) that propose combining area 
yield insurance and weather index insurance, to use the advantages of both insurance types while 
overcoming the challenges these risk management strategies face. None of the studies completely 
dismisses crop insurance as a risk management strategy, although multiple studies (e.g. Manuamorn, 
2007; Hess, 2003; Pal & Modal, 2010) underline the importance of an integrated livelihood 
perspective, in which insurance is part of a broader risk management package. 
There are several challenges that both types of insurance are facing. The main concern that was 
mentioned in the majority of studies for weather insurance (e.g. Cappiello et al.2012; Clarke et al. 
2012; Nair, 2010) and area yield insurance (e.g. Panda,2013; Rao, 2010) is basis risk. This occurs 
when the outcome for the insurance is not in line with the outcome for the farmer: a farmer 
experiences a loss without pay-out or vice versa. For weather index insurance this is mainly due to 
the poor density of weather stations and the lack of real time weather data (Panda, 2013; Cappiello 
et al.2012; Pal & Modal, 2010; Rao, 2010; Raju & Chand, 2008). For area yield insurance this could be 
ascribed to the inefficiency of crop yield estimation, which implies that the area estimation differs 
from the actual yield of the individual farmer (Cappiello et al.2012). Furthermore, both types of 
insurance are considered to face delays in payment, although for NAIS there was more agreement 
between the different studies (e.g. Panda, 2013; Cappiello et al.2012; Nair, 2010) on this topic, 
whereas for WBCIS there are conflicting results (the study of Panda (2013) considers delays an 
obstacle for WBCIS whereas the study of Clarke et al. (2012) and Giné et al. (2008) found quick 
settlement an opportunity for WBCIS). This could be due to the differences in availability of weather 
data and infrastructure in the different areas under study. The main difference in costs of the two 
insurance models is that weather index insurance needs relatively high start-up costs (i.e. weather 
stations) (Nair, 2010; Raju & Chand, 2008), whereas yield area insurance does not face a high initial 
investment, but faces high administrative and transaction costs throughout the provision of the 
insurance (Panda, 2013; Rao, 2010; Raju & Chand, 2008). Another difference between the two types 
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of crop insurance is that for area yield insurance information asymmetry problems (moral hazard and 
adverse selection) are considered to be a major obstacle (Cappiello et al.2012; Pal & Modal, 2010), 
while one main advantage of weather index insurance is that these types of problems are considered 
to be reduced (Clarke et al. 2012; Rao, 2010; Giné et al. 2008; Raju & Chand, 2008).  
Table 5.1: Challenges, opportunities and scope for improvement weather index and area yield insurance 
 Weather index insurance Area yield insurance 
Main 
challenges 
Basis risk Basis risk  
Infrastructure: lack of real time weather 
data 
Inefficiency in crop yield estimation 
 
Delay in payment indemnities Delay in settlement indemnities 
High start-up costs  Large manpower & transaction costs 
Reliance on historical data Moral hazard & adverse selection 
Complex contract index design 
 
Limited coverage (only production risks 
are covered) 
 
Main 
opportunities 
Lower moral hazard & adverse selection Available for all crops where yield data is 
available 
Quick claim settlement Combines individual and area approach 
Low transaction costs (no field visits or 
yield estimation) 
Relatively low start-up costs 
  
Scope for 
improvement 
Investment in weather stations Simplified procedure 
Raising awareness among farmers Wide publicity for creating awareness 
Wider coverage (pre-sowing & post-harvest) 
Reduce insurance unit 
Combining different insurance products 
Risk packaging; integrated risk management strategy (insurance as part of broader 
strategy) 
 
 
Several studies refer to the role of the government in insurance provision. The study of Clarke et al. 
(2012) explicitly mentions consumer protection, and the need to enhance legislation that protects 
the costumers in availing insurance products. The study of Zant (2008) also ascribes insurance market 
failure to the lack of effective legal systems to enforce insurance contracts. Furthermore, in the study 
of Goudappa et al. (2012) the creation of a separate Crop Insurance Wing within the Agriculture 
Department is proposed to overcome constraints of the scheme, whereas the study of Nair (2010) 
focuses more on mistrust farmers have towards insurance companies and believes that making 
weather stations government owned would increase the trust of the farmers in the insurance 
product. In India, there are both public and private companies that provide crop insurances. A 
solution towards having more private companies participating in the micro crop insurance market, 
while still ensuring consumer protection, could be to stimulate public-private partnerships (Raju & 
Chand, 2008). As early as 1980, the study of Biswanger already underlined the importance of policies 
that are focused on removing external constraints of farmers instead of being risk-specific. 
 
One of the main problems with both insurance types that is external to the design of the product, is 
the lack of awareness among farmers. Lack of understanding of the concept of insurance is one of 
the main reasons for the low uptake among non-borrowing farmers (Giné et al. 2008) and also makes 
farmer’s preference go out to cash reserves and savings when compared to insurance, as they often 
feel this is the safer choice (less of a gamble) (Soni & Trivedi, 2013). Several studies (e.g. Cappiello et 
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al. 2012) explicitly mentioned that the majority of insured farmers are still borrowing farmers (and 
thus the ones who have a mandatory agricultural insurance). One option of creating awareness 
among farmers is by lowering the insurance unit to a level closer to the farmer (e.g. Gram Panchayat) 
(Nair, 2010; Pal & Modal, 2010; Raju & Chand, 2008) and using insurance agents at the village level 
(Goudappa et al. 2012). The studies of Soni & Trivedi (2013) and Lilleor et al. (2005) also mention that 
self-help groups can play an important role in provision of crop insurances and raising awareness 
among farmers. 
 
For the current study it is useful to look at the scope for further research proposed by the different 
studies under review. One of the main suggestions for further research is to study how non-loanee 
farmers can be included and informed about the insurance schemes (e.g. Cappiello et al. 2012; 
Goudappa et al. 2012; Raju & Chand, 2008). The majority of insured farmers acquire an agricultural 
loan to which the insurance is linked. This implies that most of the insured farmers are involuntarily 
insured, and there is still a large group of farmers that are not aware of insurance (i.e. non-loanee 
farmers). To understand the awareness level of different types of farmers, it is important to compare 
both insured and non-insured farmers in this thesis. By analysing the insurances through the 
perspectives of small farmers, their needs and wishes will be uncovered. With these insights, crop 
insurances and risk management for small farmers in India can be further improved which is helpful 
in making these farmers more resilient against the negative effects of climate change. 
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6. Methodology 
6.1 Objective & research question 
Main objective 
To understand the merits, demerits and find points for improvement of existing crop insurances in 
India. 
 
Central research question 
How can current crop insurances in India be improved to better suit the needs and wishes of small 
farmers? 
 
6.2 Methods & techniques 
6.2.1 Literature review 
A literature review was conducted on specific literature of existing crop insurances in India. This 
review was used as input for the field work under the current study. The articles used were chosen 
for the relevance of the topic and the selection is based on including a variety of scholars and 
backgrounds. The review is intended to give a broad overview of the literature on existing crop 
insurances in India, and does not suggest to include all articles available on this particular topic. 
The main objective of the review was to find gaps in knowledge and scope for future research, as 
well as analyzing the different views on various types of agricultural insurance in India. The articles 
were analysed on the basis of four main categories: 
 Objective (& type of insurance): what is the main objective of the article? And what type of 
insurances are discussed? 
 Main observations: What are considered the main challenges and opportunities for the 
insurance types discussed? 
 Conclusions: main point of the article (major improvements of the insurance models or 
recommendations)? 
 Scope for future research: suggestions for further research and possible knowledge gaps. 
6.2.2 Field survey 
For primary data collection a survey was distributed to small and marginal farmers. The main goal of 
this method is to gain more insight in the understanding of farmers in insurance and revealing the 
merits and demerits of crop insurance. As well as gaining insight in the aspects of crop insurance that 
need to be improved to better suit farmers’ needs and wishes. The survey was conducted in 
cooperation with GIZ India, as part of their agricultural insurance project for the Agricultural 
Insurance Company India (AICI). The survey was designed in consultation with GIZ, and therefore a 
limited number of questions have been left out of the analysis as they were less relevant for the 
current research. Appendix 3 shows the field survey. The following number of surveys were 
conducted in Nashik district, Maharashtra: 
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Figure 6.1: Number of farmers in case study, divided in insured and non-insured farmer groups 
6.2.3 Focus group discussions 
To understand, evaluate, and gain feedback on the existing community based insurance programme 
focus group discussion (FGDs) were conducted. 298 farmers were (randomly) selected by DHAN 
Foundation in 8 FGDs that were held in two different blocks of Vellore district: Nattrampalli and 
Gudiyatam. In Nattrampalli the first six FGDs were held and in Gudiyatam two FGDs took place (of 
which FGD7 was a combination of two communities).  Majority of the farmers were groundnut 
cultivators but there were a few farmers who did not cultivate groundnut. Also, a large share of the 
farmers in the FGDs were women as groundnut cultivation in this region is primarily done by female 
farmers. The groups of farmers consisted of smallholder farmers (less than two hectares) and 
included both insured and non-insured farmers. In total, 102 insured farmers were present in the 
FGDs. In these sessions, insured farmers were first asked to state the amount of land they owned, 
the amount under groundnut cultivation (and the amount insured), other crops that are grown and 
other means of living they have. Non-insured farmers were also asked to explain the reasons for not 
insuring their crop. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Number of farmers in Focus Group Discussions, divided in insured and non-insured farmers 
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6.2.4 Satisfaction game 
In the FGDs a game that was played was conducted with only insured farmers under the community 
insurance. On the basis of literature, nine elements are distinguished to measure the satisfaction 
level of farmers insured under the groundnut community scheme, which are displayed in table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Nine indicators to measure satisfaction level of farmers 
Indicator Reason for including Indicator 
Premium amount paid 
 
To view whether or not the premium level is acceptable in relation to weather related 
risks farmers face  
Number of days to claim 
payment 
 
The number of days to claim payment can determine the effectiveness of the insurance in 
stabilisation of farm income. Especially in groundnut cultivation, where the seeds for next 
season are one of the major costs, timely pay-out is important to ensure that farmers 
have the opportunity to timely purchase their inputs for next season 
Yield assessment process 
 
Yield assessment is done on individual basis through the mutual insurance committee. 
This element measures the satisfaction of farmers with this assessment process 
Insurance as risk strategy 
 
Enquiring whether or not the mutual groundnut insurance covers the main risks farmers 
face in groundnut cultivation 
Level of benefit payment This indicator was added to view if the claim payment covers the actual loss of the 
farmers 
Association with fellow 
members in the 
community 
 
As the community structure is the main element that makes this insurance type different 
from other crop insurances, it is important to know how the satisfaction is towards the 
other members in the community 
Way in which members 
were included in product 
design (Inclusiveness) 
 
This indicator was included to gauge if farmers feel involved in designing stages of the 
product 
Selection of members in 
assessment process 
 
Members of the MIC are selected by the representatives of the SHGS, which are chosen 
by the members of the community. This aspect asked for the satisfaction of farmers 
towards the selection of members for the assessment committee 
Grievance Redress 
Mechanism 
 
If farmers are unhappy about any of the above mentions elements, do they feel satisfied 
with the mechanism and structure in place through which they can voice their 
grievances? 
 
For this game three colours of tokens were used (green for satisfied, blue for neutral, and red for 
dissatisfied). Nine rounds were played in which each indicator was evaluated by the farmers by 
putting their token in a pouch.  To gain more insight in the reasons for dissatisfaction of farmers the 
amount of tokens were calculated on the spot. After all indicators were evaluated, farmers were 
asked to state reasons for dissatisfaction for indicators that scored a majority of red tokens. 
 
6.2.5 Semi-structured interviews 
To gain better understanding of crop insurances in India four semi-structured interviews were held. 
Two were held in the early stages of the research: one with the micro insurance association of the 
Netherlands (MIAN) to gain broader understanding of micro insurances around the world, the 
advantages and disadvantages, and to hear the experiences of field experts; and one with a scholar 
to understand the merits and demerits from a expert working on micro insurances. One interview 
was held with a human rights advocate and scholar in New Delhi to gain insight in the position of 
small farmers and marginalised communities in India. These first three interviews were used for the 
author’s understanding of micro insurances and its broader perspective. The fourth interview was 
held with mr. Karthikeyan, Programme Leader of the Rainfed Farming Development Program of the 
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DHAN Foundation. The information from this elaborated interview was directly used in this thesis 
and gives insight in the genesis of the community-based insurance for groundnut cultivation in 
Vellore district. 
 
6.3 Data analysis 
Three sub questions are used to answer the central research question. See table 6.2 for an overview 
of the data analysis and the sections in which these questions are answered in this thesis. 
Table 6.2: Overview of research questions and data analysis  
Research question Data (analysis) Sections 
1. What kind of crop 
insurance systems do 
farmers in India use 
and why is there a 
difference in uptake? 
Literature review 
 
 
Survey (quantitative): socio-
demographic profile farmers  
 
Focus group discussions 
(qualitative) 
4.1: Crop insurance around the world 
4.2 & 5: Crop insurance in India 
 
9.1&9.2: Case study 1, differences in 
uptake explained 
 
13.1& 13.2: Case study 2, community 
insurance explained  
2. Does current crop 
insurance meet the 
needs and wishes of 
small farmers? 
Survey (quantitative & 
qualitative) 
 
Focus group discussions 
(quantitative, tokens) 
10.1 Risks experienced 
10.2&10.3: insurance needs 
 
14.3 Satisfaction game 
3. What are the merits 
and demerits of 
current crop 
insurance? 
Literature review 
 
 
Survey (quantitative, rating)  
 
SWOT analysis (quantitative &  
qualitative) 
5: WBCIS & NAIS opportunities, 
challenges, scope for improvement 
 
11.1: Rating of insurance aspects 
 
11.2: SWOT analysis 
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7. Research areas 
Primary data collection has been conducted in both Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu states in India. 
Field location 1 (Maharashtra) has been chosen for the vulnerability level and diversity in crops 
grown as well as the fluctuations in climatic conditions and affects on agricultural production. Field 
location 2 (Tamil Nadu) has been chosen for the existence of an extensive community based 
insurance scheme. See figure 7.1 for the geographical location of the states and the major risks they 
are prone to. 
  
Figure 7.1: Disaster prone area map India (retrieved from New World Encyclopedia, 2007) 
 
 
Field location 1 
Nashik district, Maharashtra 
88 farmers, field survey 
Field location 2 
Vellore district, Tamil Nadu 
300 farmers, focus groups 
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Case study 1: 
 
Nashik district, Maharashtra 
 
 
 
 
A farmer in his field (retrieved from The Hindu, 2012) 
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8. Regional profile Maharashtra & Nashik District 
 
8.1 Maharashtra 
Maharashtra is the second most populous state in India (with approximately 98 million people)  and 
is the third largest state (307,713 square kilometres) (The World Bank, 2008; TERI, s.a.). The state, 
with Mumbai as its capital, remains a financial hub of the country, with a large urban population and 
contributing to 20 per cent of India’s manufacturing output and 13 per cent of its gross domestic 
product (The World Bank, 2008). Although Maharashtra is a relatively industrialised state, the 
majority of its population (64 per cent) is working in the agricultural sector, and 47 per cent of its 
population is living below the poverty line (Met Office, 2012; The World Bank, 2008). The 
dependency on land in combination with its long coast line of 840 kilometres, makes the state 
susceptible for changing weather patterns (Met Office, 2012).  The state is particularly drought 
prone: almost a quarter of drought prone districts in India can be found in Maharashtra and 73 per 
cent of the state’s geographic area is classified as semi-arid (The World Bank, 2008). There are 
several factors influencing the state’s vulnerability: in some areas there is intensive mono-cropping; 
excessive withdrawal of groundwater; high dependence on monsoon season for rainfall (70-80 per 
cent of the rain falls in months June-September); unfavourable market conditions; and a degrading 
resource base. Irrigation in Maharashtra covers only 16 per cent of the total agricultural area with 
very limited access for small farmers (The World Bank, 2002; Met Office, 2012). Rural poverty is 
prevalent and reflects the low productivity of the rural economy in the state (The World Bank, 2008). 
 
8.2 Nashik district 
Nashik district, with capital city Nashik is divided into 15 blocks. Eight of these blocks are classified as 
tribal blocks, hence the district is identified as tribal by Maharashtra’s state government. Several 
main rivers of the state originate in the district (e.g. the rivers Godavari and Girna). Because the 
district supplies a vast amount of vegetable to the state capital of Mumbai, Nashik is sometimes 
refered to as ‘the backyard of Mumbai’. (National Informatics Centre, 2014). 
Average rainfall in the district is between 2600 and 3000, the precipitation can varies widely between 
the different blocks and seasons. The main season in which most of the rainfall occurs is from June to 
September. The government notes that the temperature in the district is increasing and the rainfall 
decreasing due to rapidly emerging industrialisation and fast deforestation. (National Informatics 
Centre, 2014). 
Main cash crops grown in the area are over the last decades have been onion and grape, although 
recently sugar cane has gained importance in the district. Main problem in crop growing has been 
lack of sufficient irrigation and precipitation. In some block farmers have therefore shifted to 
pomegranate. Other, more progressive farmers, are using greenhouses to grow flowers. (National 
Informatics Centre, 2014). 
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9. Crop insurance in Maharashtra  
In  Nashik district, both WBCIS and NAIS are available. Both insurance types available in the region 
will be explained in more detail in this chapter. As the farmers in this study cultivate onion as their 
main crop, the focus of insurance will also be specifically on onion, although there are a number of 
different crops covered by both WBCIS and NAIS that will also be mentioned. Section 9.1 explains the 
insurance types in further detail (e.g. premium amount, risks covered, government support, et 
cetera). Section 9.2 then explains the differences between insured and non-insured farmers in the 
region. 
9.1 Crop insurance aspects explained 
Crop insurances under both NAIS and WBCIS are offered in Maharashtra. There are a lot of 
similarities in the policies of the crop insurances. The main differences are in the fact that WBCIS 
covers parametric weather related risks, through automated triggers by using weather stations. 
Whereas NAIS covers most non-preventable risks, such as floods and droughts, using crop cutting 
experiments. Both insurance policies are open to loanee and non-loanee farmers, but practice shows 
that majority of farmers are under these insurances are farmers that acquire an agricultural loan and 
are therewith obliged to have crop insurance. The premium amount and maximum sum insured are 
very case specific, especially because it is dependent on farmers average yield. Premium subsidies 
are available for small and marginal farmers and often split between the state and national 
government. 
Table 9.1: Insurance aspects of  different crop insurances available in the research area 
Insurance aspects WBCIS NAIS8 
Prerequisites 
Linked to credit: Compulsory for all loanee applicant 
cultivators (those who have 
sanctioned credit from financial 
institutions for the notified crop 
(onion) in the reference unit area) 
From 2009 Onwards, Insurance is not 
compulsory for Onion, and is made 
optional for both Loanee and Non-
Loanee farmers 
Coverage 
Crops covered Onion, Tomato, Chillies, Gherkins. 
Tapioca, Turmeric, Banana, Jasmine, 
Rose, Tuberose and Grapes9 
Kharif: Paddy, Jowar, Tur, Mung, 
Udid, Nigerseed, Groundnut, 
Sesamum, Soyabean, Sunflower, 
Onion, Ragi, Maize, Cotton, 
Sugarcane  
 
Rabi: Wheat(Irrigated),Sunflower, 
Summer Groundnut, Summer  Paddy, 
Onion, Wheat(Unirrigated), Jowar, 
Gram, Safflower 
Risks covered: Parametric weather related risks like 
rainfall, frost, heat (temperature), 
humidity, et cetera. 
Non-preventable risks (e.g.flood, 
drought, natural fire, storms, 
pests/diseases). 
Claims 
Claim making Automated process using reference Based on yield data gathered with 
                                                          
8
 Government of Maharashtra, 2011 
9
 TNAU, 2013 
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process: weather stations Crop Cutting Experiments conducted 
by state government 
Payment process: Loanee-cultvators: through financial 
institutions 
 
Non-loanee cultivators: through AIC 
representative/ micro insurance 
intermediaries/micro insurance agents 
Loanee-cultvators: through financial 
institutions 
 
Non-loanee cultivators: through AIC 
representative/ micro insurance 
intermediaries/micro insurance 
agents 
Claim amount: Maximum payout is limited to the sum 
insured. Payout based on weather 
station trigger. 
In last three years farmers did 
receive claims in the area; however 
the claim amount lied between 10 % 
to 27 % of total sum insured. 
Loss assessment 
Crop loss 
assessment 
process: 
Automated, weather station trigger Crop cutting experiments in area 
Premium 
Premium amount: 2.0% or Actuarial Rate, whichever is 
less10 
Kharif onion has 17.5 % per hectare 
as premium and rabbi onion has 
10.94 % premium rate 
Maximum sum 
insured: 
Up to 150% of the value of the 
average yield 
Total maximum sum insured will be 
150% of average yield 
Subsidies: Up to 50% on premium (for small and 
marginal farmers) 
Small and marginal farmers: 10% (5% 
state government; 5% national 
government) 
 
9.2 Differences between insured and non-insured farmers 
To understand the different needs of farmers, it is important to first look at the differences in socio-
demographic profile. Accordingly, the specific requirements of the various categories of farmers can 
be established. 
 
Table 9.2: Differences in socio-economic profile between insured and non-insured farmers 
Socio-demographic 
characteristic 
Insured farmers Non-insured farmers 
Social category 
SC 3,7% 6,6% 
ST 0 8,2% 
OBC 18,5% 42,6% 
General 77,8% 42,6% 
Level of Education 
Lower than Class 5 14,8% 16,4% 
Class 5 to Class X 55,6% 52,4% 
Class XI to XII 18,5% 16,4% 
Graduate 11,1% 11,5% 
Postgraduate & Higher 0 3,3% 
Number of assets  
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 AICI, 2012 
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Phone 100 % 100% 
Tractor 81,5% 37,7% 
Dish TV 100% 86,9% 
Gas stove 92,6% 77,0% 
Motorcycle 96,3% 77,0% 
Colour TV 100% 100% 
Fridge 14,8% 27,9% 
Inverter 0% 9,8% 
Farmers’ category 
Marginal Farmer (upto 2.5 
acres) 55,6% 34,4% 
Small Farmer (2.5-5 acres) 25,9% 31,1% 
Medium farmer (5-12.5 
acres) 18,5% 27,9% 
Large Farmer (above 12.5 
acres) 0% 6,6% 
Irrigated land 
Absolute amount (owned 
land, average) 
3,0 acres 3,6 acres 
As % of total landholding 93,7% 74,9% 
Insurance types 
Life Insurance 63,0% 23,0% 
Motor Insurance 96,3% 70,5% 
Health / Medical / Hospital 
Insurance 
11,1% 4,9% 
Crop loan  
Availing crop loan 92,6% 0% 
 
Table 9.2 shows that it is not necessarily the most formally educated farmers that have crop 
insurance, nor the largest farmers: more than 50 per cent of insured farmers falls in the marginal 
farmer category. However, one of the most vulnerable groups, Scheduled Tribes (ST) is not among 
insured farmers.  This could be due to the fact that these farmers have the most marginalised 
position in Indian society (and have less access to formal risk management instruments), but also due 
to the fact that these farmers are difficult to reach or the stigma that ST brings along (not all farmers 
might want to tell they are ST). Furthermore, insured farmers do not necessarily have more assets 
than non-insured farmers. However, the biggest difference in asset is tractor (85,1% per cent of 
insured farmers versus 37,7% of non-insured farmers). This could be linked to the fact that insured 
farmers acquire agricultural loans (which could then be used to purchase a tractor), as well as 
insured farmers applying more agricultural advanced techniques. Insured farmers also have the 
largest percentage of its owned land irrigated (93,7% on average as compared to 74,9% of non-
insured farmers). This can be explained by the fact that these farmers have more knowledge of 
agricultural techniques than non-insured farmers and thus also apply these on their own farmland. 
The most important differences between these farmers are found in the insurances and crop loan 
they acquire. Motor insurance is the most prevalent insurance among both groups. It also becomes 
very clear from this table that non-insured farmers have had less exposure to insurance, either they 
acquired insurance and did not extend it (for example because payments were not regular, or they 
expected their premium back at the end of the season, like a savings bank account), or they never 
had insurance before. This has important implications for insurance companies. Specific attention 
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needs to be paid to awareness raising of these farmers, customised for farmers who have never 
experienced the process of insurance before.  If farmers already have experience with any type of 
insurance, paying premium and receiving pay-outs, it will be easier for them to understand other 
types of insurance too. 
 
10. Needs and wishes farmers in Maharashtra 
To understand the needs and wishes of small farmers, it is important to first study their perspective 
on risks and the severity of these risks and then look more closely at their loss assessment methods 
and more specific needs towards insurances (such as premium and sum insured).  
10.1 Risks faced by farmers 
Table 10.1 shows the risks in agriculture, with in the first column the amount the risk is experienced 
by the farmers, the following column the severity of the risk, and the last column the importance 
farmers give to this particular risk. The first columns (amount experienced and severity) show the 
most answered option, with the percentage this answer was given. The highest amounts in each 
column are highlighted using the following colours: 
Amount risk: Almost every year 
Severity risk: High crop loss and complete crop loss 
Rate: Three highest rated risks 
 
Table 10.1: Risk in agriculture: amount experienced, severity and importance for risk mitigation 
 
Risks in 
Agriculture 
 
Amount risk is experienced  
 
Severity risk 
 
Rate (1-100) 
Importance for risk 
mitigation 
Poor quality of 
inputs 
Almost every year 
 (66,2%) 
Small, but significant 
(61,5%) 
30 
Lack of labour 
supply 
Almost every year (47,7%) 
Small, but significant 
(60,0%) 
25 
Unseasonal 
rains 
Every 1-3 yrs (36,9%) to 
every 3-5 yrs (41,5%) 
Medium loss (50,8%) to 
small but significant loss 
(43,1%) 
15 
Loss from Stray 
/ Wild Animals 
Almost never (70,8%) Negligible  loss (90,8%) 7,5 
Excess Rains Every 3-5 yrs (36,9%) 
Medium crop loss (41,5%) 
to high crop loss (32,3%) 
40 
Drought / 
Deficient 
Rainfall 
Every 1-3 yrs (32,3%) to 
every 3-5 yrs (27,7%) 
High crop loss (41,5%) to 
complete crop loss (33,8%) 
45 
Hailstones 
Never (40%) to every 10 yrs 
(35,4%) 
High crop loss (36,9%) to 
complete crop loss (36,9%) 
40 
High Winds / 
Storms 
Every 1-3 yrs (38,5%) 
Small but significant loss 
(33,8%) to medium crop 
loss (27,7%) 
15 
Adverse Price 
Movements 
Almost every year (30,8%) to 
every1-3 yrs (27,7%) 
Negligible loss (36,9%) 15 
Loss from 
wastage / 
quality 
deterioration 
Every 1-3 yrs (73,8%) 
Small but significant 
(56,9%) 
10 
Credit 
interlocking 
Almost every year (49,2%) 
Small but significant 
(43,1%) 
12,5 
Pests and 
diseases 
Almost every year (50,8%) 
Small but significant 
(61,5%) 
35 
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Dew/ fog Almost every year (73,8%) Small but significant 
(46,2%) 
25 
 
As was expected, excess rainfall and drought are perceived as major risks for farmers. These are also 
the risks with the highest severity of crop loss. However, there was one other risk that stands out: 
hailstones. Although this risk the has the second highest rating, farmers also acknowledged the risk 
to occur very sporadically (every 10 years to almost never). Looking at the severity of hailstones 
could explain these somewhat conflicting answers. Although hailstones do not appear very often, 
when hailstones are experienced, they damage the crop severely (it is the one of the two risks where 
a large number of farmers experience complete crop loss). Thus, although hailstones might not occur 
very often, the damage they bring can be disastrous for farmers.  
Furthermore, what is interesting to see is that the risks that are experienced every year, are not the 
ones that bring the most damage to the crops. This might imply that farmers learn how to cope with 
this relatively small but consistent risks, rather than dealing with the more severe risks which do not 
occur every year and could be very irregular. Thus, the need for farmers to increase their resilience 
should mainly focus on these risks which could potentially lead to major crop losses. What the 
diversity in experience of the hailstones risk also showed, is the need for farmers to opt to include 
certain risks in their insurance policy. As farmers do not experience all risks completely similarly, they 
might want to choose whether or not to include certain risks in their coverage. 
  
10.2 Loss assessment methods applied  
To understand what farmers’ needs and wishes are for insurance loss assessment, it is important to 
see how farmers themselves assess when there is crop loss. Therefore, farmers were asked to state 
their loss assessment method according to the different perils. In the previous section, the three 
most important risks were stated to be: excess rain, droughts/ deficit rain, and hailstones. For these 
three perils we now look at loss assessment methods. 
Table 10.2: Loss assessment methods category 1 and 2 farmers 
Risk Loss assessment 
Excess rain Physical (overall) assessment (95,4%) 
Drought Observing crop growth (56,9%) 
Observing weather change, weather pattern 
(12,3%) 
Hailstones Crop and field assessment (86,2%) 
Not seen (12,3%) 
 
For all three risks, the majority of farmers apply some sort of physical assessment of their crops to 
establish the damage done by any of the weather perils. Only some of the farmers look at the 
weather change or pattern for drought, and this was not even mentioned for excess rainfall or 
hailstones. This could have an implication for weather index based insurances, as farmers not 
necessarily use weather as an indication for crop losses, but apply physical assessment of their own 
crops. These data show that individual field assessment of crops is preferred for the most important 
risks of these farmers. And although the majority of farmers uses physical assessment to calculate 
their losses, majority of farmers stated they had never heard of crop-cutting experiments before to 
calculate losses. Clearly, there is a mismatch of what the farmers themselves apply and prefer as 
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opposed to the terminology insurance companies use for calculating pay-outs. On the other hand, as 
only a couple of farmers look at the weather to establish their losses, almost none of the farmers had 
ever heard of insurance based on weather data. 
 
Farmers were also asked how many claim payments would be ideal during 10 seasons of crop 
insurance. Not surprisingly when you look at the occurrences of the main risks (every 3-5 years for 
drought and excess rain, and every 10 years for hailstones), the majority of farmers considered one 
to three payments ideal. Which, for an insurance to be sustainable is also preferred over a pay out of 
every single year.  
 
Insured farmers were asked more in depth questions. To assess whether rainfall is sufficient for 
planting, farmers apply different methods, most of which involve physical assessment of rain. This is 
done by checking the soil (observing depth of wetness, there should be at least 7 to 8 inches of 
moisture), and the number of rainfall in the sowing period (at least 1 to 2), but also by checking the 
level of water in wells and rivers. For crop insurance this means that rainfall and wetness of soil play 
an important role in the initial phase of crop cultivation, and should be taken into account in policy 
design. Insured farmers also assess their losses mainly by physical assessment, although some 
farmers also mentioned to base loss assessment on their agricultural experience. Experience also 
plays an important role when farmers are setting their target yield for the season. However, the 
availability of water and labour are also important indicators to establish the target yield. Of a bit less 
importance is crop monitoring. This is an interesting finding, as this means that in setting a target 
yield the physical assessment is less important than the weather circumstances and experience, 
while in loss assessment this is reversed. 
 
When talking to insured farmers about the differences in yield between their neighbours and them, 
agricultural inputs (such as fertilizer and the quality and type of seeds) are mentioned as reason for 
creating differences, and similar agricultural inputs as reason for comparable outputs. In comparison 
to other farmers in the village (not direct neighbours), water availability and irrigation systems are 
considered important reasons for diversity in yield. This again makes clear that crop insurance cannot 
be a stand-alone measure, but needs to be part of a broader risk management package. In this area, 
water availability is an important constraint to agricultural production, which means that the 
installation of water buffering systems (e.g. drip irrigation) in combination with crop insurance could 
increase the resilience of these farmers and increase the feasibility of crop insurance. This also 
becomes clear when asking farmers about the ways losses can be mitigated: mainly agricultural 
inputs are mentioned for risks specifically related to the farmers themselves. But when asked about 
ways to deal with uncontrollable risks a couple of farmers mentioned crop insurance, but most 
farmers did not see an option for this. 
 
By far, the majority of farmers perceive a community based model for insurance desirable. And to 
achieve a village level insurance programme, there is a need (mentioned by the farmers themselves) 
to involve farmers in the insurance design and implementation of such an insurance. Also, the 
pooling of risks is considered to be essential, which should function as the basis of a community 
based insurance programme.  
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10.3 Premium and the role of insurance companies 
To understand the awareness level of farmers that have basic understanding of insurance and 
agricultural techniques (30 farmers), they were asked some general insurance questions. When these 
farmers were asked to mention three insurance companies, only two farmers could mention three 
different companies, two more could mention only two, three farmers could mention one company 
and the rest (23 farmers) did not know any insurance company. Clearly, for farmers not in direct 
contact with insurance companies (and even for farmers that are), the visibility and presence of 
these companies in the village is lacking. 
Insured farmers want the premium of crop insurance to be based on both historical loss experienced 
from insured perils and want an affordable premium at the same time. Confusion about terms and 
conditions and the fact that farmers often feel that insurance policies are rather complicated, is why 
farmers are asking for transparent and regular information provision and want to have clear terms 
and conditions set for the insurance. As farmers often experience insurance as a gamble (they never 
know whether it will pay out), it would also be helpful to build in a guarantee mechanism. For 
frequent widespread losses on account of insured perils, farmers emphasised the need for a refund 
mechanism (e.g. returning at least half of the premium or  have a bonus system in place if there is no 
pay out for at least five years). This is particularly important for small farmers, for whom premium 
can be a relatively large amount of their disposable income. 
According to the farmers, insurance companies should play different roles. They want a fair 
settlement process in which the insurance company clearly explains how losses are assessed and on 
what basis the level of claim payments are set. There should thus be a transparent loss assessment 
mechanism which is also explained to farmers. This could also involve training of farmers in 
understanding the sometimes complex structure of the crop insurance. Furthermore, as farmers 
have more trust in a village level committee (consistent of people they know and are accessible 
whenever they have any questions or enquiries) than in an insurance company they do not know 
very well, farmers are suggesting insurance companies to establish village level committees that can 
be used to verify the insurance process. Apart from information provision, transparency and an 
understandable insurance policy, another issue with insurance companies has been the delays in 
claim payments. For small farmers, this has serious consequences, as they need the payments to buy 
inputs for the next season. Thus, insurance companies need to make sure claim payments are timely 
and reach the farmers in time to actually reduce their vulnerability. 
 
. 
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11. Evaluation of crop insurance aspects 
To understand what aspects of crop insurances are preferred, and what aspects need to be 
improved, farmers were asked about their preferences. The more in depth questions were asked to 
insured farmers. Section 11.1 shows the ratings farmers gave to different insurance aspects, and 
section 11.2 combines both the literature review and the survey into a SWOT analysis.  
11.1 Rating insurance aspects 
As insured farmers have some basic insights in crop insurance, they were asked to their  
preferences of three main aspects of the insurance: risks covered, peril coverage, and loss  
assessment method (see table 11.1). The different aspects were ranked in the subcategory as well as  
compared between categories to understand what aspects these farmers find most important. 
 
Table 11.1: Preferences insurance aspects  
 Group 
Ranking 
Yes (%) No (%) 
Risks covered Weather 1  73,3 26,7 
Pests / Diseases 2  50 50 
Price / Market 3  20 80 
Loss from Animals / Theft 4  3,3 96,7 
Peril coverage All Perils 1 46,7 53,3 
High-Intensity Loss Events 2 36,7 63,3 
Named Perils 3 23,3 76,7 
Loss assessment 
method 
Group-based 1 43,3 56,7 
Village-based 2 40 60 
Individual Assessment 3 20 80 
 
Preference for risks covered goes out to weather and to a lesser extent pest and diseases. This also is 
in line with the risks experienced and their severity from chapter 10. As loss from animals or theft did 
not play an important role in crop loss, there is almost no preference for this option. For the peril 
coverage, all perils and high-intensity loss events are both preferred options, but not with the 
majority of farmers (46,7% and 36,7% per cent respectively). Both group and village based loss 
assessment are preferred options over individual assessment, which is a somewhat surprising 
outcome, but could be due to the fact that farmers are more familiar with group and village based 
decision making, and might not fully understand the insurances product (as became clear in chapter 
10 with regards to crop-cutting experiments). 
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Table 11.2: Rating crop Insurance aspects (according to insured farmers) 
Crop Insurance Features Rating 
(Out of 100) 
Standard 
deviation 
1. Active / Higher Involvement in Design of Crop 
Insurance 
71,7 14,0 
2. Revenue / Income Insurance (Crop Insurance that 
takes into account both production and price risks) 
70,0 18,7 
3. Voluntary Coverage under Crop Insurance 
69,6 24,0 
4. Insurance for losses that arise from unseasonal 
rains, hailstorms etc. after harvest 
66,7 20,5 
5. Community / Group-based Loss Assessment and 
Claim Redistribution (Community to be responsible 
for assessment of crop losses from insured perils 
and also for redistribution of claim amount received 
from insurance) 
58,7 17,1 
6. Premium-Refund based Multi-year Policy (Single 
Crop Insurance Policy providing coverage for 
Multiple Years and Returning Premiums in case of 
No Claims) 
57,8 22,3 
 
Table 11.2 shows that insured farmers rank involvement in the design of crop insurance the highest, 
with the lowest standard deviation. This is in line with the qualitative data used in the previous 
chapter. They also rate income or revenue insurance as second. This means that farmers want the 
insurance to cover not only production risks (such as excess or deficit rainfall) but also changes in 
price. As most farmers are insured mandatory because they avail a crop loan, voluntary coverage is 
also seen as an asset for these farmers, to opt in or out of insurance if and when a farmer deems this 
necessary. Clearly, many of the aspects are considered important by the farmers, and there are 
differences in preferences. This marks the importance of a tailor-made approach. Farmers need to be 
able to choose the aspects of insurance (such as peril coverage) if they find it important for their 
specific circumstances. 
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11.2 SWOT Analysis 
Summing up the findings in the previous chapter, a SWOT analysis was used (see table 11.3) for 
individual micro insurances under NAIS and WBCIS combined. Both the literature review and the 
outcomes of farmers’ ratings and qualitative data chapters, were used to find the harmful and 
helpful aspects of current crop insurance in India. The following definitions are used: 
 
Internal 
 Strengths: these consist of helpful aspects in product design of the insurance. 
 Weaknesses: these are characteristics that place the insurance design (technical and financial 
aspects) in disadvantage, and can thus be considered harmful. 
External 
 Opportunities: these are chances in the environment that can increase the effectiveness of 
the insurance. 
 Threats: these are elements in the environment that could hinder the effectiveness of the 
insurance. 
Table 11.3: SWOT analysis micro crop insurance 
 Helpful Harmful 
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STRENGHTS 
 
Weather peril coverage 
 
1-3 payments per 10 seasons 
 
Coverage of production & price risks 
WEAKNESSES 
 
Basis risk 
 
Complicated terms and conditions 
 
Delays in claim payments 
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OPPORTUNITIES 
Involving farmers in implementation 
Village based information structure 
Part of integrated risk management 
strategy 
THREATS 
Lack of awareness and understanding 
Lack of infrastructure (e.g. weather stations) 
 
As the opportunities for crop insurance in India mostly point towards community insurance and 
involvement of farmers in implementation and design of crop insurance, the next chapter studies the 
most comprehensive case in India where these recommendations were turned into reality: 
community crop insurance in Tamil Nadu in India. 
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Case study 2: 
 
Vellore district Tamil Nadu 
 
 
 
 
Focus Group Discussion with farmers in Vellore district, Tamil Nadu (photo from fieldwork) 
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12 Regional profile Tamil Nadu & Vellore district 
12.1 Tamil Nadu 
12.1.1 Geographic profile 
Tamil Nadu is located at the South eastern part of India, with a long coastline stretching over 1000 
kilometres over the eastern and southern part of the state. Due to its long coastline temperatures do 
not reach extremes in summer and winter season. The state experiences both southwest monsoon 
and northeast monsoon, table 12.1 displays the percentage of rainfall for the different seasons 
(Revenue Administration, Disaster Management & Mitigation Department, 2006). 
 
Table 12.1: Tamil Nadu rainfall in the different seasons 
Season 
 
Months Normal 
rainfall 
in mm 
Percentage 
of annual 
rainfall 
Winter rains January- February 47.00 4.82% 
Summer rains March – May 138.00 14.12% 
Southwest monsoon June – September 322.00 32.96% 
Northeast monsoon October - December 470.00 48.10% 
Average rainfall 977.00 100.00% 
(Retrieved from Revenue Administration, Disaster Management & Mitigation Department, 2006) 
 
The state covers a total land area of 130,058 square kilometres and is home to 72,138,958 
inhabitants resulting in a population density of 555 per square kilometre (Government of India, 
2011a). The literacy rate in the state is 80.33 per cent for the entire population, with a difference for 
males (86.81 per cent) and females (73.86 per cent) (Government of India, 2011a). Tamil Nadu 
counts 32 districts, of which Vellore is one.  
 
12.1.2 Groundnut farming Tamil Nadu 
Karunakaran et al. (2009) found that farmers in Tamil Nadu selected groundnut cropping for several 
reasons, which included realisation of higher income, being best suited to their land, and meeting 
fodder requirements for their livestock (as groundnut hay is used to feed livestock). Decisions on the 
practices of groundnut farming depends on ownership of the farm resources (e.g. assets such as 
land, credit, livestock and machineries), which implies that in most cases the male holds decision 
power (Karunakaran et al. 2009). In Tamil Nadu, both NAIS and WBCIS government schemes are 
available for groundnut farmers to insure their crop. Table 12.2 and 12.3 show the performance of 
both schemes in Tamil Nadu. The performance of the two insurance types show that very little 
farmers actually benefitted from the government insurance schemes available in the state. 
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Table 12.2: Performance of NAIS of groundnut in Tamil Nadu 
Year 
(BE) 
Area  
Covered  
(%) 
Claims  
Ratio 
Premium / 
sum  
assured (%) 
Claims / sum  
assured (%) 
Farmers  
Benefited/  
Farmers Covered  
(%) 
2001-2002  0.37 1.34 3.50 4.70 18.87 
2003-2004  0.15 1.21 3.50 4.23 31.52 
2005-2006  0.12 0.69 3.50 2.40 14.75 
2007-2008  0.27 0.07 3.50 0.26 2.74 
2009-2010 1.05 1.37 3.57 4.98 35.63 
(retrieved from National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research, 2011, p.7) 
 
Table 12.3: WBCIS in Tamil Nadu in 2008-09 to 2009-10 
Company 
name 
Number of 
farmers 
Area in 
hectares 
Sum 
insured Rs. 
Lakhs 
Full 
premium 
Rs. Lakhs 
Claims Rs. 
Lakhs 
Farmers 
benefited 
AICI 36935 41119.75 7988.6 758.6 237.8 13645 
(36.97%) 
ICICI 
Lombard 
129 92 23 2.505 0 0 
(0 %) 
IFFCO Tokio 27 28.8 6.29 0.659 0.31 13 
(48.15%) 
Total 37091 41240.55 8017.89 761.73 238.07 13658 
(Retrieved from Kumar et al. s.a.) 
12.2 Vellore district 
Vellore district consists of an area of 6,077 square kilometres, with a total population of 3,928,106 
and a population density of 572 people per square kilometre (which is slightly higher than the 
average for the state) (Census2011, 2011). Literacy rate in Vellore is 79.65 per cent (86.96 per cent 
for males, 72.43 per cent for females). The rural population makes up 56.87 per cent of total 
population (Census2011, 2011). 
Vellore experiences a tropical climate with rainfall from both southwest monsoon (contributing to 45 
to 52 per cent of rainfall) and northeast monsoon (contributing to 30-43 per cent of rainfall) 
(Balakrishnan, 2009). The annual normal rainfall for Vellore district is 949.8 mm and mean 
temperature range from 18.2°C to 36.8°C (Balakrishnan, 2009).  Table 12.4 displays the rainfall in 
Vellore district compared to the ‘normal’ rainfall for Tamil Nadu. With reference to the `Normal' , the 
following classification is made (from Directorate of Economics and Statistics, s.a.) 
 `Excess' : (+) 20.0 per cent and above: 
 `Normal' : (-) 19.9 per cent to (+) 19.9 per cent.  
 `Deficit' : (-) 20.0 per cent to (+) 59.9 per cent.  
 `Scanty' : (-) 60.0 per cent and less. 
As becomes clear from the table, although annual rainfall can be considered normal for all years 
except 2007, there is a lot of variation within the different seasons. Vellore district experiences both 
deficit and excess rainfall in the various seasons of the year. 
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Table 12.4: Vellore district rainfall compared to Tamil Nadu ‘normal’ rainfall 
 TN 
Normal 
(in mm) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
South-West 
Monsoon 
316.1 427.7 582.4 312.1 434.4 456.8 
June 41.9 121.2 85.5 44.5 44.5 116.8 
July 71.2 34.4 188.9 70.4 17.5 123.3 
August  90.2 75.5 183.8 87 120.7 99.7 
September 112.8 196.6 124.2 110.2 251.7 117 
North-East 
Monsoon 
431.1 308.7 441.1 376.3 238.8 410.7 
October  180.9 162 159.1 121.5 17.4 88.9 
November 165.1 109.6 65.3 247.7 154.1 234 
December 85.1 37.1 216.7 7.1 67.3 87.8 
Winter 
Season 
35.3 3.2 1 14.3 2.4 9.5 
January 21.0 3.2 0 11.4 2.4 9.5 
February 14.3 0 1 2.9 0 0 
Hot- Winter 
Season 
129.1 116.2 124.3 160.8 83.1 132.1 
March 19.5 34.8 0 66.9 1.2 0 
April 42.6 26.1 59.9 10.6 10.8 19.7 
May  67.0 55.3 64.4 83.3 71.1 112.4 
Total annual  911.6 855.8 1148.8 863.5 758.7 1009.1 
 
Agriculture plays an important role in Vellore District: 40 per cent of the population directly depends 
on agriculture (both cultivators and agricultural labourers), and one third of the geographical area is 
used for cultivation (Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development Studies, 2008). In the district 
there are 411,091 agricultural landholdings which cover a total size of 275,578 hectare. The average 
size of a landholding is 0.67 hectare, which classifies as smallholding (Government of Tamil Nadu, 
s.a.)  The main crops under cultivation in Vellore district are shown in table 12.5. 
 
Table 12.5: Main crops cultivated in Vellore district 
Crop Area under cultivation 
(in hectare, 2005-06) 
% of Total Cultivation 
(net area 
sown=2099.03 km2 or 
209903 hectares in 
2005-06) 
1. Groundnut 59,842 28.5 
2. Paddy 58,163 27.7 
3. Millet & other 
cereals 
24,041 
11.5 
4. Pulses 20,088 9.6 
5. Sugarcane 17,202 8.2 
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6. Cotton 7,013 3.3 
7. Gingelly 794 0.4 
(Retrieved from Balakrishnan, 2009) 
 
Although irrigation is predominant in the district, the majority of groundnut cultivation is rainfed 
(49,540 hectare rainfed against 15,535 hectare irrigated in the 2006-2007 season) (Centre for 
Agricultural and Rural Development Studies, 2008). The fact that Vellore is a drought prone district 
has resulted in overexploitation of ground water in a large number of blocks through open wells and 
deep bore wells (Centre for Agricultural and Rural Development Studies, 2008). Both Nattrampalli 
and Gudiyatham blocks experience overexploitation of groundwater (Balakrishnan, 2009). In Vellore 
district, the crop insurance government scheme that is available is NAIS, WBCIS is not available in 
Vellore district. Table 12.6 shows the coverage of farmers in Vellore district under NAIS: the majority 
of farmers are loanee farmers (and avail insurance as mandatory condition of their agricultural loan). 
 
Table 12.6: NAIS coverage of loanee and non-loanee farmers in Vellore District 
Programme Number of 
farmers 
Area (in 
hectare) 
Sum insured 
(in lakh ₨) 
Premium (in 
lakh ₨ ) 
NAIS 08-09:11  
loanee farmers 
6345 7070 1295.6 29.6 
NAIS 08-09: 12   
Non-loanee 
farmers 
1411 307 61.1 1.4 
13. Community based insurance: DHAN’s mutual insurance 
The community based crop insurance scheme has been implemented by DHAN (Development of 
Humane Action) Foundation since 2007. DHAN Foundation works on various rural development 
projects. Prior to implementing pilot mutual insurance policy, DHAN Foundation had experimented 
with index based insurance for three years.  
 
13.1 Piloting Index Insurance 
2003 and 2004 were particularly harsh years for Vellore in terms of droughts and deficit rainfall. In 
response, DHAN Foundation searched for a risk management strategy that could be implemented for 
farmers to reduce the negative impact of these weather-related risks. In cooperation with ICICI 
Lombard, index-based rainfall insurance was launched in the 2004-2005 season in Natrampalli and 
Tirumangalam (Tamil Nadu) covering Groundnut, Cotton and Blackgram farmers. Prior to 
implementation there were several consultation rounds with the farmers through the DHAN 
structure (with committee members, after which decisions were communicated back to the farmers 
for feedback). The index insurance was a pilot project for three years. Every year improvements were 
made on the basis of feedback of farmers. After three years, consultation with farmers on the index 
insurance resulted in discontinuing this type of insurance. DHAN Foundation’s experience with index 
based insurance highlighted several inherent problems of weather based index insurance: 
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 ‘Basis Risk’, due to variation between villages and the reference weather station in 
experiencing rainfall 
 Insurance companies were not able to offer customized policies on a micro-scale 
 The weather insurance product for groundnut based on rainfall did not reflect reality in 
terms of yield risk. For example: the rainfall insurance product pertaining to early part of 
the sowing season always need higher premium; but yield has always been better if sown 
in the early part of the sowing season 
 
In addition to these problems, there were also problems of farmers trying to externalize the issue of 
yield loss and look forward towards some compensation irrespective of the crop loss situation. This 
was mainly due to inadequate understanding of the concept of insurance (Karthikeyan,2013). 
 
Table 13.1 below depicts DHAN Foundation’s experience in piloting deficit rainfall insurance in 
Natrampalli for three years. From the table it can be viewed that in 2005-06, farmers experienced a 
loss to crop yield due to excess rainfall however they did not receive any compensation because they 
were insured against deficit rainfall. 
 
Table 13.1: Deficit rainfall index insurance DHAN Foundation 2005-2007, Natrampalli 
Details/ Year 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 
Crop Groundnut Cotton Groundnut Cotton Groundnut 
Type of policy Single phase Single phase Multiple phase 
Units 119 29 506 73 182 
Area per unit 0.5 acre 0.25 acre 0.5 acre 0.25 acre 0.5 acre 
Farmers 109 21 432 41 182 
Premium (Rs) 17,993 8,175 101200  46,264 
Sum Insured (Rs) 3,57,000 1,45,000 15,18,000  2,73,000 
Rainfall received Slightly 
Deficit 
Slightly 
Deficit 
Excess rainfall Optimum rainfall 
Crop performance Average Loss due 
to deficit 
rainfall 
Loss due to excess 
rainfall 
Above average 
Compensation 29183 24490 - - - 
Per unit compensation 245.2 844.5 - - - 
Insurance company ICICI Lombard 
Source: M. Karthikeyan,2013 
 
Based on their experience of Rainfall Index Insurance, DHAN Foundation felt that there was a need 
for tailor made, location specific means of covering production risks faced by rain-fed farmers.  
Learnings from Index Insurance based on DHAN Foundation’s experience  
 Micro climates exists even at small geographies 
 Significant variation in rainfall pattern and quantum among village rain gauges  
 Number of rainy days are decreasing  
 Copious rains within few rainy days  
 Rainfall is not uniformly distributed 
 Drought before and after the crop’s critical period even though the average rainfall is 
received during the entire cropping season 
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Also, they were of the opinion that insurance mechanism should be such that it needs to be owned 
by the insured farmers to avoid conventional problems of adverse selection and moral hazard and to 
make it a solution in terms of motivating the farming community to look for all means of avoiding 
risk. Therefore, DHAN Foundation shifted to Mutual Crop Insurance (MCI) as it offered all these 
advantages. 
 
13.2 Piloting Mutual Crop Insurance (Community Insurance) 
DHAN Foundation piloted mutual yield based insurance in 2007. The participating members were 
already organised into Self-Help Groups (SHGs) of around 15-20 members for various farming related 
interventions provided by DHAN Foundation in the past. The same structure was used for insurance 
as well. The technical support to pilot mutual crop insurance was provided by Micro Insurance 
Association of the Netherlands (MIAN) and back up guarantee support was given by Eureka Re. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.1 DHAN Community Model Source: DHAN Foundation, interview 
 
13.2.1 Designing a Mutual Insurance Product 
Data on past experience of rain-fed groundnut cultivation in Natrampalli was collected from a group 
of farmers. This included frequency, levels and causes of loss, variations across the location and cost 
of cultivation. MIAN used this data to create a mutual insurance product. This product was discussed 
in detail with MIC and they customized the product in terms of sum insured and premium per acre. It 
was decided to go for the groundnut mutual insurance policy with Rs 2,000 as sum insured and Rs 
500 as premium per acre. Out of Rs 500, the risk premium was Rs 468 and the administrative cost 
was Rs 32. The design of the product was such that cost of cultivation was considered as the bench 
mark for compensation and not the expected income to make the product affordable. The MIC also 
evolved the norms for implementing this mutual insurance product for groundnut and methods of 
assessing yield. In designing the product and the mechanism of monitoring, concerted efforts were 
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taken to avoid conventional problems of crop insurance i.e. adverse selection, moral hazard and slow 
loss assessment process. (Karthikeyan, 2013). 
 
Table 13.2: Details of the mutual insurance scheme 
Crop Insured Sum Insured per acre (Rs) Premium paid by Farmers per acre (Rs) 
Groundnut 2,000 500 
 
13.2.2 Selection of farmers and plots 
Identification and selection of members was done under the following criteria: 
 Small (5 acres) and marginal (2.5 acres) farmers 
 Predominantly rainfed farming hamlet (30 per cent or less irrigated land) 
 Solidarity among farmers, which implies farmers being either neighbours or at least within a 
2 kilometre radius 
The team of MIC member, professional and associate visit each farm to identify the insured plot of 
land and to take basic details of groundnut crop. If the sowing is taken up in shaded area, such area is 
deleted from coverage. Also, if low seed rate was practiced, seed rate based area is taken for 
coverage. 
 
13.2.2 Yield assessment process 
Farmers under this policy are indemnified based on actual loss assessment done by older and wiser 
farmers. To accomplish this, a committee named as Mutual Insurance Committee (MIC) was formed 
by selecting two to three farmers from each location. These farmers were selected based on their 
track record of involvement in community activities and knowledge of groundnut cultivation. 
 
Table 13.3: Mutual Insurance Committee (MIC) 
 A Mutual Insurance Committee (MIC) is formed at the federation level 
 The number of members in MIC is around 15 to 30 
 The generic roles of this committee is: 
 
(i) Policy making related to insurance product and reviewing the policy at periodical 
intervals 
(ii) Implementation of insurance product 
(iii) Managing the funds related to insurance 
 
 The specific roles vary with products 
 
As per the norms of mutual crop insurance policy, all farmers were required to inform the MIC a 
week prior to intended harvest. The plot harvested without giving information would be removed 
from coverage. The MIC members visit each farm just before harvest to assess yield. A sample from 
the farm is taken to assess the yield of the insured plot of land. Sample yield assessment is done by 
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using a cycle tyre. Sample is collected from four corners of the plot at a distance of 10 feet from each 
corner and also in the centre. The measurement of yield is done by crown filling method, whereby 
the conversion ratio is: 
12 Litre=1 Vallam   
( 1 Vallam= 8 Kg of fresh produce) 
42 Vallams=1 Putti 
While measuring yield, one eighth of volume of the fresh produce is to be deducted for wages and 15 
Vallam (i.e. 120 Kg) is to be deducted for half acre seed material. Also the value of plant residue is 
not taken into account for calculating total income. The current year farm gate price is used for 
calculating value of the produce. Average price for the season is found by taking into account high 
and low prices in the season. 
 
13.2.3 .Addressing moral hazard  
Moral hazard risk was addressed by introducing retention, which requires farmers to pay a pre-
determined percentage of their loss themselves. The extent of retention of losses by the farmers was 
decided by themselves as 35% i.e. Rs 1,000 out of the total expected loss of Rs 3,000 per acre. 
 Furthermore, the organization of the claim assessment process was expected to ensure a further 
reduction of moral hazard risk and an improvement in time and cost efficiency. Because each MIC 
member was responsible for assessing claim in his/her own area, they were expected to be to be 
more aware of the production history of the insured person and plot. This would entail good 
judgment of crop damage quickly. Also, an implication of farmers owning the mutual pool is that they 
are very critical to what type of farmers is accepted as members in the insurance pool. This 
environment of social control and familiarity of colleague farmers with production circumstances 
help abandoning of fraudulent farmers and those who have not taken adequate preventive 
measures. For example: if a plot is highly prone for losses it would be rejected from coverage in the 
beginning itself (Karthikeyan). 
13.2.4 Exclusion of compensation 
Compensation is not given for human negligence, which is identified during periodic visits. Also, if 
there is yield loss due to heavy weed infestation, the plot is removed from coverage. Similarly, if 
there is yield loss due to damage by wild animals (wild pigs) the plot is removed from coverage. In 
addition, if sowing is taken up in shaded area, such area is deleted from total area covered. 
 
14. Performance of Community based Insurance 
 
14.1 Business Statistics 
DHAN Foundation insured 379 farmers under its mutual crop insurance policy in 2012-13 in 
Natrampalli and Gudiyatham blocks of Vellore district.77.3 per cent of the farmers were from 
Natrampalli and 22.7 per cent were from Gudiyatham block. Under this scheme 201.1 acres of land 
was insured, out of which 78.9 per cent of the insured land was in Natrampalli and 21.1 per cent in 
Gudiyatham. 
Of the 379 insured farmers in the two blocks, 308 farmers i.e. 81.3 per cent of farmers actually 
benefitted (i.e. [Actual Pay out-Premium Paid]>0) from the mutual insurance scheme. In the two 
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blocks, there is a difference in percentage of farmers that benefitted: in Natrampalli 91.5 per cent of 
total insured farmers in the block benefitted, whereas in Gudiyatam this was only 46.5 per cent.  
 
Table 14.1: Business Statistics Mutueal Insurance 2012-13 
STATE  No. Of 
farmers 
covered  
Area insured 
(Acres) 
Payout 
Limit 
(Rs) 
Gross 
premium 
(Rs) 
 
Claims  
Paid 
(Rs) 
Claims/Premium 
Ratio 
No. Of 
farmers 
benefitted*  
Natrampalli 293 158.6 3,17,160 78,900 2,33,855 3.0 268  
(91.5%) 
Gudiyatham 86 42.5 85,000 21,625 30,915 1.4 40  
(46.5%) 
Total 379 201.1 4,02,160 1,00,525 2,64,770 2.6 308  
(81.3 %) 
*(Actual Pay out-Premium Paid)>0 
 
14.2 Profile of Insured Farmers 
The average area insured per farmer under this policy was 0.53 acres. Out of the total insured 
farmers, we interacted with 26.4% of the insured farmers. These farmers were randomly selected 
from the two blocks by DHAN Foundation officers. Average land holding of the sample was 2.1 acres 
out of which average land holding under groundnut cultivation was 1.0 acres, which constitutes 
47.6% of their total land holding. It was observed from the sample that in Natrampalli around 44.0% 
of the land holding was for groundnut cultivation while in Gudiyatham, major share of the land 
holding (78.5%) was kept for groundnut cultivation. The rest of the land was intercropped with Green 
Gram, Black Gram, Red Gram, Fodder Sorghum, Little Millet and Field Bean. 
 
Table 14.2: Profile of Insured Farmers 
 Nattrampalli  Gudiyatam Total 
Population 
Total number of insured 
farmers under groundnut 
community insurance 
293 farmers 86 farmers 379 farmers 
Average area insured 
(groundnut) of total 
population (in acres) 
0.54 acres 0.50 acres 0.53 acres 
Sample Focus Group 
Sample size focus group 
discussions  
76 
farmers 
25.94% 24 
farmers 
27.91% 100 
farmers 
26.4% 
Average land size of sample 
population 
2.3 acres 1.4 acres 2.1 acres 
Average land size under 
groundnut cultivation sample 
population (in acres) 
1.0 acres 1.1 acres 1.0 acres 
Share of groundnut land in 
total landholding area 
(sample population) 
44.0% 78.5% 47.6% 
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14.3 Satisfaction community insurance 
In the Focus Group Discussions farmers were asked to rank each indicator as satisfied, neutral or 
dissatisfied.  Based on these ratings a weighted average score was calculated. An average score 
between 1 and 2 is considered dissatisfied, an average score of 2 is considered neutral and an 
average score between 2 and 3 is considered as satisfied. The satisfaction index for the various 
indicators are portrayed in figure 14.1 (the calculations can be found in appendix 4). The scores 
suggest that the farmers are satisfied with all the indicators however the indicator ‘No of days to 
claim payment’ and ‘Level of benefit received’ received  a relatively low score in comparison to all 
the other seven indicators. 
Figure 14.1: satisfaction index 
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14.3.1 Not satisfied: 2,0 and lower 
There is one indicator that just falls into the category of not satisfied on the index scale: Level of 
benefit payment. This means farmers are not satisfied with the amount of pay-out they receive when 
a claim is  made. As the pay-out is done on an individual farm basis, some farmers expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the fact that neighbours received a larger pay-out. Also, remarks were made on 
the difference between loss and level of payment. However, insurance was not discarded as risk 
management strategy (see indicator Insurance as risk strategy). 
 
14.3.2 Mildly satisfied: 2,1-2,5 
Two indicators the farmers were neutral to mildly satisfied are  Number of days to claim payment 
and Yield assessment process. As the assessment process is based on a individual farm level, where 
the Mutual Insurance Committee takes a random sample, the time to pay-out can take a relatively 
long time, which makes the farmers less satisfied with the pay-out time. This could also pose a 
problem, as farmers often need the pay-out to purchase new groundnut seeds. The assessment 
process is done in the presence of the farmer and it did not become crystal clear why the assessment 
process was not higher rated by the farmers; also because this type of assessment process was 
established after consultation with farmers. However, the mild satisfaction on this category could be 
related to the exclusion of certain plots (e.g. in the shadow) and no pay-out when there are problems 
with wild animals. 
 
14.3.3 Highly satisfied: 2,6 and higher 
On the majority of indicators (6 out of 9) the farmers were highly satisfied (more than 75 percent on 
the index scale). These include the premium amount paid; insurance as risk strategy; association with 
fellow members in the community; inclusiveness; selection of members in assessment process; 
grievance redress mechanism. The fact that this particular insurance scheme was designed in 
consultation with the farmers themselves and aspects such as premium amount paid were checked 
with the farmers before included in the insurance, could explain the satisfaction level of the farmers 
in the community-based scheme. Also, the democratic process in which farmers are chosen to 
represent their community on a higher level within the structure is likely to contribute to satisfaction 
of farmers and the feeling that they can redress their grievances and feel that they have (and had) 
influence on the insurance design. 
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 15. Discussion 
The situation of small farmers around the world can be read about in policy documents and 
academic literature. However, it was only when talking to these farmers that I realised how profound 
the problems are they are facing. In some villages, women headed households are very common: 
although the husbands often have the power to make decisions, women are doing the farm work and 
are taking care of the children, while men migrate in search for employment opportunities. This 
makes these households even more vulnerable. By listening to the problems these farmers are 
facing, climate change has become dauntingly real. These farmers face the changing climate every 
single day. Although I feel mitigation is as important as adaptation, for the daily reality of millions of 
people around the world, adaptation will be the only short term solution that can make them more 
able to cope with the weather and climate related issues they are facing.  
It is hard to imagine that the people that provide food, and work the lands, are not the first ones we 
think about when discussing climate change issues. Small farmers around the world have been living 
on their lands for generations, and are now experiencing the negative consequences of other 
people’s progress and development. It is due time that rural communities are listened to and 
empowered to the extent that they are able to cope with the hardships they are facing every day. 
One of the most important lessons for me has been how urgent the issues at hand actually are. Not 
only farmers, but rural development (and more importantly empowerment) in general is not on the 
agenda. Zooming in on the study at hand, it would be interesting to study the gender role more 
thoroughly, especially in a country as India where the gender roles are very inflexible and women are 
often deprived of basic rights. Talking about risk management is per definition also talking about 
rights and access to land and resources. One of the things that worry me in the case of crop 
insurances is that commercial companies, that have no connection to the community they are selling 
a product to, are solely there to make a profit. This would not be a big problem if the contract 
reflects a symmetric power relationship. However,  a large number of farmers never had any type of 
insurance before and therefore do not fully grasp the product they are buying. In a country where 
the government (on several levels) is not always as effective as would be ideal, lack of regulation (or 
implementation of regulations) could lead to insurance companies taking money out of communities 
that would much rather be invested in strengthening communities. In this, working together with 
local organisations of course helps. And although the structure DHAN Foundation implemented is 
very promising, it is questionable whether it would be even possible to scale up such a structure. 
Strong local organisations are essential to further the development of community insurance. DHAN 
already had a structure in place, and it seems that cooperatives and self-help groups can not only be 
useful for farmers to function as a safety net, but might in the future also help farmers to become 
more productive. 
It is important to keep in mind while reading this thesis that the case studies are location specific. 
Climatic, cultural, social and economic differences in other locations can therefore influence the 
usability of the results in other places and circumstances. However, by using both farmers under 
automated micro insurances as well as community insurance, a broader overview is given as opposed 
to one single group of farmers under one type of crop insurance. 
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16. Conclusion & recommendations 
India is a country with 80 per cent of its farming population being categorised as small and marginal 
farmers. These are farmers with very little buffer, and are extremely vulnerable to any shocks and 
stresses. As they have a high dependency on natural circumstances for cultivation of their crops, 
climate change negatively affects their ability to cope and reduces their overall resilience. It is a 
matter of life and death for these farmers to find suitable risk management strategies to deal with 
risks that are beyond their control. Crop insurance is one such measure which has emerged over the 
last two decades and could be helpful to small farmers. India is the country with the largest number 
of farmers insured under micro crop insurances. And although crop insurance has been integrated in 
national policies (i.e. WBCIS and NAIS), there are still large differences in understanding of these 
instruments, as well as dissatisfaction among farmers. This study has therefore looked at crop 
insurances from the perspective of the farmers themselves, with the following question being central 
to this research: 
How can current crop insurances in India be improved to better suit the needs and wishes of 
small farmers? 
First of all, it needs to be emphasised that crop insurance alone is never a panacea for the problems 
small farmers are facing. An integrated risk management strategy is necessary to empower these 
farmers and build their resilience. However, crop insurance can play an important part in this, but 
only when it is tailor made according to the needs and wishes that are expressed by farmers 
themselves. The following conclusions can be drawn from the results sections of this thesis: 
 
Conclusions case study 1: Nashik district, Maharashtra:   
 The most understanding farmers are not necessarily the most (formally) educated or the 
ones with the largest owned land, nor the ones with the largest amount of assets. However, 
farmers with more knowledge and understanding of insurance have been exposed to 
insurance more than non-understanding farmers, and irrigate a larger percentage of their 
land (applying more agricultural techniques).  
 The main risks to crop are excess and deficit rainfall, although hailstones also  play an 
important role. However, the most severe perils are not the ones that occur every year. 
Farmers emphasise the need for pooling of risks through a community based insurance 
programme, the need for information provision from insurance companies, clear terms and 
conditions, timely payments, and a village level committee for verification of loss 
assessment. 
 Coverage of weather perils is considered most important for farmers, and insured farmers 
want to be more involved in crop design as well as having voluntary coverage and both 
production and price risks covered under the insurance. Furthermore, farmers need to be 
able to opt for the aspects of insurance they find necessary for their crop cultivation. 
 
Conclusions case study 2: Vellore district, Tamil Nadu 
 On the majority of indicators (6 out of 9) the farmers were highly satisfied. These include the 
premium amount paid; insurance as risk strategy; association with fellow members in the 
community; inclusiveness; selection of members in assessment process; grievance redress 
mechanism. The fact that this particular insurance scheme was designed in consultation with 
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the farmers themselves and aspects such as premium amount paid were checked with the 
farmers before included in the insurance, could explain the satisfaction level of the farmers 
in the community-based scheme. Also, the democratic process in which farmers are chosen 
to represent their community on a higher level within the structure is likely to contribute to 
satisfaction of farmers and the feeling that they can redress their grievances and feel that 
they have (and had) influence on the insurance design. 
 One of the main problems that was found among non-insured farmers, is their lack of 
awareness and understanding of the product design.  Some of the farmers discontinued their 
insurance, as they expected their premium back at the end of the season, but did not receive 
a payment. These farmers then perceived insurance as being a gamble. This lack of 
understanding of the insurance product is problematic as this leads to exclusion of a very 
vulnerable group of farmers. 
 
Although the farmers in the case studies (and small farmers in general) are extremely vulnerable and 
face serious threats to sustain their livelihoods, this does not take away the fact that there is also a 
lot of knowledge these farmers carry around about their crop cultivation, weather conditions, and 
agricultural inputs. Too often, the perspectives of these farmers are forgotten or ignored. Risk 
management strategies and instruments are created far away from their daily reality. One of the 
traits rural India possesses, is the great sense of community. It is a shame that most insurance 
companies design crop insurance without properly consulting farmers in every step of the process. 
By not involving small farmers, and not empowering the community they are part of, there is no way 
these insurances will be sustainable or beneficial for these farmers in the long run. By investing in the 
community, instead of taking resources out of the community, farmers and their villages can actually 
be made more resilient. Only then can crop insurance start to make a difference in the lives of small 
farmers in India. 
 
This research can serve as a case study to learn from for other developing countries around the 
world. Although climatic or political circumstances can differ, the very basis of these farmers is the 
same: they are dependent on weather conditions for their harvest and thus extremely vulnerable for 
climate change. Listening to their perspective should be priority in designing any policy or risk 
management instrument. The following recommendations can be used to better suit the needs and 
wishes of small farmers with regards to crop insurances: 
 
Policy & insurance recommendations 
I. Awareness campaigns custom made for farmers never exposed to insurance before. 
Innovative ideas can be to work with games to let farmers understand the process of 
insurance, as well as working with community groups and icons (instead of information 
brochures) to make sure also illiterate farmers gain understanding of the product before 
taking up crop insurance. 
II. Involving farmers in product design is one of the most important steps to guarantee that 
their needs and wishes are actually served through the crop insurance instrument. This 
involves understanding the risks these farmers face, the perils they want to have covered, 
but also the implementation process. Understanding needs and wishes of small farmers 
should be done at a community level, using community leaders and progressive farmers, 
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which are trusted within the community (rather than only using outsiders from the insurance 
company). 
III. Risk pooling through community based insurance structure  makes sure the insurance is 
more accessible for all types of farmers, while at the same time empowering the community 
to insure itself against perils. Structures already in place (e.g. Gram Panchayat or Self-Help 
Groups) can be used to set up insurance committees in farmer communities. 
 
Further research: 
I. Insurance design: combining community and area insurance? 
In general, insured farmers under the community structure were satisfied on most aspects of 
their groundnut insurance. However, the fact that the assessment process works on an 
individual yield assessment basis, results in delays in claim payment. One of the 
recommendations therefore is that a combination of the community structure and an index 
insurance (with an automatic trigger) could be desirable to reduce the dissatisfaction on 
number of days to claim payments but still use the advantages of the community structure 
(e.g. pooling of risks & community empowerment). Further research into this aspect is 
necessary. 
i 
II. Integrated risk management strategy: find the best mix of tools! 
Insurance alone is not enough. Crop insurance needs to be part of an integrated risk 
management approach towards climate change. Not only do smallholder farmers need 
financial instruments to stabilise income, risk prevention and risk reduction together with risk 
finance are necessary to increase their resilience. Which tools, instruments and strategies 
work best for small farmers around the world, need to be further analysed in a location 
specific context. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Key concepts 
Adaptation 
‘[..] adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected  
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.’ 
(IPCC, 2007, p.869). 
 
Adaptive capacity  
‘[..] those characteristics of an individual, household, or population group which enable it to 
alter or structurally reorganize its activities to diminish present threats to survival while 
enhancing its ability to address new risks.’ (Eakin, 2005, p.1924) 
 
Adverse selection 
Information asymmetry, where potential insured hide information about their risk from 
insurers, which leads to false assessments and premia (Barrett et al. 2007). 
 
Climate change 
‘[..] change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters 
the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate 
variability observed over comparable time periods.’ (UNFCCC, 2013)  
 
Formal risk management strategies 
‘[..]market-based activities and publicly provided mechanisms.’ (The World bank, 2001, 
p.140) 
 
Informal risk management strategies 
‘[..]arrangements that involve individuals or households or such groups as communities or 
villages[..]’ (The World Bank, 2001, p.140) 
 
Marginal farmer 
 Marginal farmers are those who cultivate less than one hectare of land (FAO,2010)  
 
Micro insurance 
‘The protection of low income households against specific perils in exchange for premium 
payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved.’ (CGAP in NABARD, 
2008, p.96). 
 
Mitigation  
‘an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the anthropogenic forcing of the climate system, 
which includes strategies to reduce greenhouse gas sources and emissions and enhancing 
greenhouse gas sinks’ (IPCC, 2007, p.878). 
 
[70] 
 
Moral hazard 
This occurs when insured resort to actions that increase their exposure to the risk they have 
insurance for, thus exceeding the risk exposure that was estimated when the premium was 
established, leaving the insurer with a higher risk (Barrett et al. 2007; Davies et al.2009). 
 
Small farmer 
Farmers who cultivate between one and two hectares of land are considered small farmers 
(FAO, 2010). 
 
Sustainable livelihood 
‘A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims and access) and 
activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable which can cope with 
and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and 
provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes 
net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long 
term.’ (Chambers and Conway, 1992, p.6). 
 
Resilience to climate change 
‘[..]having the ability to plan for, survive, recover from and even thrive in changing climatic 
conditions.’ (ECA, 2009 in Lasco et al. 2011) 
 
Vulnerability to climate change 
‘[..]the degree of susceptibility to harm, damage or loss as a result of climate change impacts 
or events.’ (IPCC, 2001 in Lasco et al. 2011) 
[71] 
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Farmers suggested improvement of 
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claims; insurance service at 
doorstep; simplified procedure; 
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Biggest disadvantage NAIS: delayed 
claim settlement 
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Problems NAIS: financial non-
viability; delay in claim settlement; 
moral hazard; adverse selection; 
limited coverage; cross-subsidisation 
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Give an overview of 
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Agriculture not really fit for 
insurance due to systemic and 
covariant risk 
 
Problems NAIS: basis risk; delay in 
receiving yield estimates leading to 
delays in settlement of indemnities; 
non-coverage; lack of infrastructure 
and manpower 
 
Advantages weather index: faster 
payouts; contract is more 
transparent; transaction costs are 
lower; less susceptible for moral 
hazard  
 
Challenges weather index: non-
availability of reliable and quality 
weather data, basis risk, complex 
index contract design 
Index based insurance is the way 
forward in developing nations 
 
Developing countries  often lack 
historical yield data, but have 
historical rainfall data to be used 
in rainfall index 
 
Best results can be achieved by 
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Satellite imagery based 
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and Development 
(The World Bank) 
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Describing an 
innovative rainfall 
insurance product 
offered to 
smallholder 
farmers in Andhra 
Pradesh, India 
 
Rainfall index 
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Take-up of rainfall insurance 
decreases with basis risk, increases 
with household wealth, and 
decreases with binding credit 
constraints 
 
Index insurance is transparent and 
inexpensive, enables quick payouts, 
minimises moral hazard and adverse 
selection 
Lack of understanding most 
important reason for not taking 
up insurance  
 
Risk averse households are less 
likely to purchase insurance (if 
unfamiliar with insurance vendor) 
 
Insurance innovations: 
Combining insurance with short-
term loan; promptly payouts by 
using automatic rain gauges 
network  
Determining the causal 
effect of rainfall insurance 
on income and 
consumption smoothing 
 
Price elasticity of demand 
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The interaction between 
rainfall insurance and 
other risk-bearing 
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The pattern of diffusion 
of insurance participation 
over time 
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NAIS; exploring the 
problems and 
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implementing 
insurance schemes; 
suggest effective 
insurance 
programme 
 
NAIS & WBCIS 
The availability of formal instrument 
for diffusion of risk (e.g. crop 
insurance) will facilitate farmers to 
adopt risky but remunerative 
technology and farm activities, 
resulting in increased income. 
 
Individual insurance: accurate and 
timely compensation, but high 
administrative costs. 
 
Weather index insurance: timely 
compensation based on 
(transparent) weather index, but 
poor density of weather stations  
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Lowering insurance unit to Gram 
Panchayat would reflect yield loss 
at a reasonable level. 
Pilot studies to build 
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increase participation of 
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through public-private 
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crop index 
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panel data set of 
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the asymmetric information 
problems and deal with covariance 
of risk 
 
A common reason for insurance 
market failure is lack of effective 
legal systems to enforce insurance 
contracts 
 
The larger the sensitivity of a farmer 
the larger the potential risk 
reduction achieved through area-
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Optimal crop revenue insurance 
depends on the gross revenue 
index, the price index, and the 
yield index 
 
The impact of feasible price index 
insurance and feasible 
production index independently 
is moderate 
 
Basis risk is shown to increase 
with risk aversion and with 
premium rates 
Combining different index 
insurances 
[78] 
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Manuamorn, O. P. 
 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study the scaling up 
of BASIX’s weather 
insurance program 
 
Weather index 
insurance 
Advantages index based insurance: 
reduced moral hazard and adverse 
selection; lower administrative costs; 
standardised and transparent 
structure; availability and 
negotiability; reinsurance function; 
versatility (bundling with other 
financial services) 
 
Challenges index based insurance: 
basis risk; precise actuarial 
modelling; education; market size; 
weather cycles; microclimates; 
forecasts  
From a development perspective, 
it is important to distribute 
weather insurance as a whole 
package of livelihood 
enhancement products 
 
There is need for investment in 
network of weather stations 
throughout the country 
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Lilleor, H.B., Giné, 
X., Townsend,R., 
Vickery, J.  
 
2005 
Literature review 
on insurance, risk 
sharing and 
consumption 
smoothing and 
providing a case 
study of weather 
insurance  
 
Rainfall insurance 
in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
 
Farmers apply a range of risk 
management strategies, both 
income smoothing (ex ante) and 
consumption smoothing (ex post),  
 
In semi-arid India households often 
have to rely on income smoothing in 
the case of idiosyncratic (weather) 
shocks) 
 
The demand for insurance depends 
on individual farmer’s WTP and the 
correlation between actual payouts 
and economic losses from adverse 
weather events 
The choice of motivator in 
villages can be crucial for take-up: 
progressive farmers and SHGs are 
important entry-points 
 
Substituting crop insurance with 
weather insurance will introduce 
a more efficient and low cost 
scheme for the government, and 
a more transparent and actuary 
product for farmer 
 
 
Role of motivator in take-
up  
 
Farmer’s WTP 
 
Role and effectiveness of 
marketing in villages 
 
Farmer’s awareness 
related to take-up of 
insurance 
[79] 
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Hess, U. 
 
The World Bank 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Outlining an 
integrated crop 
loan insurance and 
risk management 
product for Indian 
finance and 
agriculture 
 
Monsoon index 
insurance 
The proposed scheme seeks to 
transfer systemic risk out of the 
farmer-bank relationship into 
insurance markets 
 
Proposed scheme is combination of: 
monsoon index insurance; a risk 
management account; weather risk 
reinsurance; a smart card 
The crop loan insurance scheme 
helps banks to increase their 
lending volumes; bring down 
default rates and transaction 
costs; help farmers stabilise their 
income and access greater credit 
(due to enhanced collateral)  
Testing the proposed 
insurance loan scheme in 
combination with other 
risk management 
strategies and techniques 
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Binswanger, H.P.  
 
1980 
Study risk attitudes 
of farming 
households 
through interviews 
and experimental 
gambling approach. 
 
 
Differences in investment behaviour 
observed among farmers facing 
similar technologies and risks cannot 
be explained primarily by differences 
in their attitudes but would have to 
be explained by differences in their 
constraint sets, such as access to 
credit, marketing, extension, etc. 
Policies are needed that are 
geared towards removing 
external constraints instead of 
being risk-specific. 
Explore policies that 
remove external 
constraints for farmers 
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Appendix 3: Field survey Maharashtra 
Socio-Economic Profile of the Respondent  
1. Name: ………………………………………………………………………………........ 
 
2. Father’s /Husband’s Name: …………………………………………………………. 
 
3. Age (in years): 
 
4. Gender (Code: Male-1, Female-2)      
 
5. Social Category: (Code: SC-1, ST-2, OBC-3, General-4) 
 
6. Level of Education :    
[Code: Lower than Class 5 - 0, Class 5 to Class X -1, Class XI to XII – 2; Graduate – 3;  
Postgraduate & Higher – 4]  
 
7. Farmers’ Category :    
[Code- Marginal Farmer (upto 2.5 acres)-1, Small Farmer (2.5-5 acres)-2, Medium (5-12.5 acres)-3, 
Large Farmer (above 12.5 acres)-4] 
 
8. Land holding (in acres)  
 Irrigated Un-irrigated Total  
8a.Total land holding: 
(owned land)          
  
                         . 
                    
                    . 
  
                         . 
8b.Leased land, If any                                            
                         . 
 
  
                    . 
 
  
                         . 
 
        
  8c. Total  
                          
                         .               
                                          
 
                    . 
                         
 .       . .   . 
 
9. Two main sources of Irrigation 
[Code: Rain-fed – 1; Canal / River – 2; Wells/Tube-wells-3; Tanks-4; Ponds / Reservoir – 5; 
 Others - 6 (Pl. specify_____________________)]        
 
 
 
10. Landline:            
  
  
     Mobile: 
 
 
 
Name of Investigator: - ………………………………. 
 
 
Signature                   : - ……………………………….
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1: Awareness level of Farmer 
 
a. Please share your knowledge of the following agricultural techniques? 
 
 Have you 
heard of it? 
(Y=0; N=1) 
Do you 
use/apply it? 
(Y=0; N=1) 
Briefly explain the concept: 
a. Soil Testing (Testing of soil for 
understanding soil properties, 
availability of nutrients in soil etc.)  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
b. Seed Treatment (Stands for 
treating seeds with chemicals 
before sowing to protect infection/ 
diseases)   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
c. Sprinkler / Drip Irrigation 
(Mechanized method of irrigation 
that saves water and allows for 
judicious application of water) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
d. Organic Farming / Certification 
(Cultivation practice without use 
of chemical fertilizers, pesticides 
and other chemicals, involves 
application of manures and 
biological pest control) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
e. SMS-based Market / Weather 
Advisory (Advisory services such 
as market information over phone, 
weather forecast and advisory for 
agricultural practices to be 
adopted as per the forecast)  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. General Understanding of Insurance 
 
a. Have you heard of insurance? (Y=0; N=1)       
 
 1. Life Insurance  
 
2. Motor 
Insurance  
 
3. Health / Medical / 
Hospital Insurance  
4. Livestock / Asset / 
Crop Insurance 
 
b. What types of 
insurance do 
you know of? 
      (Y=0; N=1) 
    
c. Do you have any 
of these 
insurance? 
      (Y=0; N=1) 
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d. How does life insurance differ from other types of insurance listed above? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(For Interviewer: Life insurance pays out insured amount in the event of death of the insured. Life 
insurance is normally for longer coverage period (more than a single year) and requires premium 
payment at regular intervals. Life insurance is used by people as a savings product and the premium paid 
is returned with some bonus on survival of insured person. Scope for fraud and moral hazard is lesser in 
life insurance and is easier to verify. Other types of insurance compensate the insured in the event of 
losses/ damages due to insured event. Usually the coverage period for other type of insurance is one 
year only and chances for moral hazard or fraud are very high. Claim verification process involves loss 
estimation and is a complex process).     
 
e. Can you highlight the three most important characteristics / attributes of insurance? 
        
1. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. _______________________________________________________________________ 
      
_______________________________________________________________________ 
3. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
(For Interviewer: Imp. attributes of insurance are: (a) Pooling of risks from a larger population to 
compensate for losses of few, (b) Compensating only for actual losses occurred due to the risk event 
insured against (i.e. indemnify the insured), (c) Insurable interest: Person opting for insurance must 
have monetary interest in the property he is insuring and risk event will lead to monetary loss to the 
insured, (d) Insurance is different from savings/ investment/ credit and (e) Insurance does not 
brings in any inflows from outside, rather redistributes money across contributors and across 
time). 
 
1.3 Awareness and Understanding of Crop Loans and Crop Insurance 
 
a. Do you avail crop / agricultural loan from any bank?  (Y=0; N=1)     
 
b. If yes, from which bank (name):  ______________________________________ 
 
c. Rate of interest (% p.a.) applicable if you repay your crop loan on time   
 
      
d. Do you have a Kisan Credit Card (KCC)? (Y=0; N=1)     
 
 
e. If yes, what is the limit of your KCC (in Rupees)? 
 
f. Has your bank ever made a deduction from your crop loan towards crop insurance?   
            (Y=0; N=1)     
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g. Are you aware that crop insurance is mandatory with crop loans provided by banks? 
             (Y=0; N=1)     
 
h. How, according to you, can crop insurance become relevant for farmers in India?   
  
 
i. Which of the following assets do you/ your family have at present? Tick the applicable ones 
 
a. Mobile Phone  f. Motorcycle/Scooter  
b. Four-Wheeler/Tractor  g. Color Television  
c. Dish TV / Cable TV / Set-
top Box 
 h. Refrigerator / Fridge  
d. LPG Gas Stove / Cylinder  i. Inverter / Solar Panel  
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2: Farmer categorisation (for interviewer) 
 
Based on the information provided by respondents to the questions in previous section, the respondent 
farmers need to be categorized into 3 categories. To categorise farmers, firstly complete the following 
questions based on farmers’ responses and then categorise them in the matrix given below:  
 
2.1 Agricultural understanding 
How many techniques answered correctly (tick the one that applies)? (Refer to Question 1.1: Please 
share your knowledge of the following agricultural techniques?)  
      
1. Farmer describes less than 2 (0-1) techniques correctly,  
Has difficulty explaining the concepts. 
2. Farmer describes 2-3 techniques correctly 
3. Farmer describes more than 3 (4-5) techniques correctly,  
Has little trouble elaborating on the use of the techniques. 
 
2.2 Insurance understanding 
 
1.2e How does life insurance differ from other types of insurance? 
1. Does not understand difference 
2. Can describe difference 
3. Can describe difference and also highlight characteristics of insurance (1.2f)  
 
1.3g Are you aware that crop insurance is mandatory with crop loans provided by banks? 
 
1. Not aware at all 
2. Aware about mandatory crop insurance 
3. Aware about mandatory crop insurance 
 
2.3 Categorisation 
 
Category 1: Farmer has very little understanding of agricultural techniques; does not grasp the concept 
of insurance; and cannot articulate the functioning of crop insurance. Most of the responses in 1
st
 box.  
Category 2: Farmer has basic understanding of agricultural techniques; understands only the basic 
concept of insurance; and can articulate the functioning of crop insurance in very general terms. Most of 
the responses in 2
nd
 box for above mentioned questions. 
Category 3: Farmer has reasonable to good understanding of agricultural techniques (and applies 
these himself as well); understands the concept of insurance (and can explain this); and can articulate the 
functioning of crop insurance in more detail. All responses in the 3
rd
 box for the above questions. 
Such farmer may also own assets such as mobile phone, refrigerator, colour television or four-wheeler.   
Tick the one that applies: 
Very little understanding (1) Basic Understanding (2) Fair Understanding (3) 
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3: Risks and risk management  
(Applicable to both Category 1 and Category 2 farmers) 
 
3.1  Profiling of key risks in agriculture  
 
Risks in Agriculture How often do you 
experience this 
risk?  
(0 = almost every 
year;  
1 = every 1-3 years;  
2 = every 3-5 years;  
3 = every 5-7 years;  
4 = every 7- 10 years; 
5 = > every 10 years; 
6 = Never) 
 
Severity risk 
 
0 = negligible / minor 
crop loss;  
1= small but 
significant crop loss;  
2 = medium crop 
loss;  
3 = high crop loss;  
4 = complete crop 
loss 
Rate (1-100) 
Importance for risk 
mitigation 
Downward     Upward  
a. Poor quality and lack of 
timely access of inputs 
   
 
b. Lack of labour supply     
c. Loss from Stray / Wild 
Animals 
   
 
d. Unseasonal rain     
e. Excess Rainfall     
f. Drought / Deficient 
Rainfall 
   
 
g. Hailstorm     
h. High Winds / Storms     
i. Adverse Price 
Movements 
   
 
j. Loss from wastage / 
quality deterioration 
   
 
k. Credit interlocking     
l. Pests and diseases     
m. Dew/ Fog     
 
a. What are the different ways/ methods you use for estimating your losses on account of the 
following perils? 
 
Weather 
Parameter 
Peril/ risks Loss estimation method 
a. Rainfall 
1. Drought / 
Deficient Rainfall 
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2. Excess / 
Unseasonal Rainfall 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Other Weather 
Elements / 
Events 
 
 
 
1. High temperature 
 
 
 
 
 
2. High humidity 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Frost 
 
 
 
 
4. Fog/ Dew/ Mist 
 
 
 
 
 
5. High Winds 
 
 
6. Hailstorms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. Others 
 
1. Pests and 
diseases 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Damage by wild/ 
stray animals 
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3.3 Based on your experiences during the last 5-10 years, please share with us your views about the changes in the following weather 
parameters.  
Weather 
Parameter 
 Effect on your Farming and Risk 
Mitigation Strategies 
(Link this with change in weather 
parameter- rainfall, temp. etc. in 
general and not specific aspects) 
Type of Change No Change Decrease Increase Degree of 
Change 
(H/M/L)* 
a. Rainfall 
1.No. of Rainy Days 
 
 
    
2.Seasonal Rainfall Volume 
 
 
   
3.Length of Dry Spells 
 
 
   
4.Incidence of Unseasonal Rains 
 
 
   
5.No. of High Rainfall Days 
 
 
   
6.Hailstorm 
    
b. Temperature 
 
 
 
1.Minimum Temperature 
 
 
    
 
2.Maximum Temperature 
 
 
   
3.Average Temperature 
 
 
   
4.Days of Low Temperature / Frost     
5.Days of High Temperature 
 
 
   
6.Extremity / Range of Temperature 
 
    
c. High speed 
Winds / Storms 
 
1.Frequency of High speed Winds / 
Storms / Cyclones 
     
d. Others,  
specify: 
 
 
 
 
     
*(H/M/L) ~ High/Medium/Low
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(Following questions are applicable only to the Category 2 farmers) 
 
 
3.4 Have you heard about crop insurance that is based on crop yields estimated through crop 
cutting? (Code: Yes-0, No-1) 
 
3.5 Have you heard about the crop insurance based on weather data?                    
(Code: Yes-0, No-1) 
 
3.6 Can you name some insurance companies providing crop insurance? 
 
1. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. _______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. _______________________________________________________________________ 
3.7 What number of claim payouts do you consider ideal during 10 seasons of crop insurance 
coverage? (Code: One to Three-1, Four to Six-2, Six and above-3) 
a. (Code: Yes-0, No-1) 
 
b. Reason for your opinion: 
 
 
3.8 Will you buy a crop insurance policy if it does not yield payouts in the first 2-3 seasons of 
coverage?  
a. (Code: Yes-0, No-1) 
 
b. Reason for your opinion: 
 
 
a. Basic inputs for crop insurance 
 
 Select the Preferred 
Option from each Group  
a. Risks covered 1. Weather  
2. Pests / Diseases  
3. Price / Market  
4. Loss from Animals / Theft  
b. Peril coverage 1. Named Perils  
2. All Perils  
3. High-Intensity Loss Events  
c. Loss assessment 
method 
1. Individual Assessment  
2. Group-based  
3. Village-based  
 
 
 
4: Applicable to Category 3 farmers only:  
(Fair/ good understanding of crop insurance) 
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4.1 Please provide the following information related to your crop production in recent years 
 
*(Deficient Rainfall / Dry Spell – 1; Unseasonal Rainfall – 2; Excess Rainfall / Floods – 3; Extreme / High 
Temperature – 4; Low Temperature / Frost – 5; Pests & Diseases – 6; Hailstorm – 7; Fog / Dew – 8; 
Storms / High Winds – 9; Wild / Stray Animals – 10; Others – 11) 
4.2 Loss assessment 
a. How do you judge when rainfall is sufficient for planting? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b. How do you assess your yield/ loss in yield in a bad crop year?  
(For interviewer: based on experience/as suggested by other farmers/ inspection of field, based on 
weather pattern etc.)  
 
 
 
 
 
c. In any crop season, on what basis do you set your target yield? 
 
 
d. Do you think your target yield for any crop is similar to yield expectation of your neighbouring or other 
fellow farmers for the same crop? (Yes=0, No=1) 
Reason for your opinion 
 Recent Season Last Season Last 5 Years 
a. Crop (Specify Main Crop)    
b. Yield for your farm(s) (Kg/Acre) 
   
c. Contribution to annual income (in %) 
   
d. Average Yield in your village (Kg/Acre)  
   
e. Major Cause of External Losses in your farm(s)* 
   
f. % Reduction in your Yield 
   
g. Major Cause of External Losses in field of your 
neighbor* 
   
h. %  Reduction in yield of your neighbor 
   
i. Major Cause of External Losses in your village* 
   
 
j. % of Farmers suffering Major Losses in your 
Village 
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e. Are your losses similar to losses of other farmers in the village? (Yes=0, No=1) 
f. If not, then are such losses on account of risks related to/ specific to you only, and how do you identify 
the causes of those losses?  
 (For interviewer: Such as location of farm, slope of farm, type of soil, type of seed sown etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
g. In your view, what can be done to mitigate losses on account of risks related to/ specific to you only?  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
i. Do you think that all risks which cause loss to crops can be controlled by farmers?  
  (Yes=0, No=1)  
   
  If no, then what are the risks that you believe cannot be controlled by farmers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
l. What is the extent of uncontrollable losses experienced by you, even after using risk mitigation 
measures for uncontrollable risks?  
 
What, according to you, can be the options to deal with uncontrollable risks? 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Developing village level insurance programme 
 
a. Do you think that crop insurance can be a helpful instrument to mitigate losses which are outside 
the control of farmers? (Yes=0, No=1) 
 
 
b. If a village level insurance program is to be implemented, what are the important steps for 
developing such a program? (For interviewer: Pooling of risk, crop monitoring etc.) 
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c. What kind of claim intimation, loss assessment and settlement mechanisms do you envisage for 
crop insurance programs? (For interviewer: institutional mechanism, community model etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. What should be basis for calculating the sum assured under the proposed insurance  
(Expected Value of Production = 1, Cost of Cultivation = 2,  
Cost of Cultivation plus Some Return = 3, Other = 4) 
 
Specify (Other)……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
e. What should be the basis for arriving at the premium for crop insurance?  
(For interviewer: Affordable Contributions; Historical Loss Experience from Insured Perils etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. What is the best suited mechanism for monitoring and assessment of losses under the insurance 
program?  
(Self-reporting by farmer=1, Community monitoring and assessment=2,  
Farm visit for verification=3, Triggers based on weather data= 4, Satellite=5, Others= 6) 
 
g. What is the most optimal unit of insurance which is best suited for you/ other farmers? 
(Individual Farm level = 1, Farmer Group-level = 2, Village Level = 3,  
Gram Panchayat level=4, Mandal / Hobli / Taluka / Block level = 5, Others = 6) 
 
Specify (Other)……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
h. In case of frequent, widespread losses on account of insured perils, how would you ensure that 
insurance continues to be relevant to farmers by providing expected benefits? 
 
 
i. Going by the situation in previous question, what, according to you, is the role of insurance 
companies, particularly with respect to crop insurance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                         92 
 
 
4.4 Out of the options given below, rank the following features of crop insurance based on their 
appeal? 
(Tick the one the farmer prefers over others and ask why) 
 
Crop Insurance Features Rating 
(Out of 100) 
Reason for preference 
7. Premium-Refund based Multi-year Policy (Single Crop 
Insurance Policy providing coverage for Multiple Years 
and Returning Premiums in case of No Claims) 
  
8. Community / Group-based Loss Assessment and Claim 
Redistribution (Community to be responsible for 
assessment of crop losses from insured perils and also for 
redistribution of claim amount received from insurance) 
 
9. Revenue / Income Insurance (Crop Insurance that takes 
into account both production and price risks) 
 
10. Voluntary Coverage under Crop Insurance 
 
11. Active / Higher Involvement in Design of Crop Insurance 
 
12. Insurance for losses that arise from unseasonal rains, 
hailstorms etc. after harvest 
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Appendix 4: Calculations satisfaction index 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Differences in number of farmers can be explained by the fact that some farmers withheld giving their 
preference to some of the indicators. 
Indicator 
  
  
Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied   Weighted 
Score 
Average 
Score 
A B C D=(A+B+C) E=(3XA)+(2X
B)+ 
(1XC) 
E/D 
Number 
of 
Farmers 
Number of 
Farmers 
Number of 
Farmers 
Total Number 
of Farmers13 
    
Premium 
Amount Paid 
83 
76.85% 
11 
10.19% 
14 
12.96% 
108 285 2.6 
No. of days to 
claim Payment 
43 
39.45% 
30 
27.52% 
36 
33.03% 
109 225 2.1 
Yield 
Assessment 
Process 
74 
68.52% 
19 
17.59% 
15 
13.89% 
108 275 2.5 
Insurance as 
Risk Strategy 
99 
90.00% 
4 
3.64% 
7 
6.36% 
110 312 2.8 
Level of benefit 
payment 
44 
40.00% 
18 
16.36% 
48 
43.64% 
110 216 2.0 
Association 
with fellow 
members in the 
community 
97 
89.81% 
10 
9.26% 
1 
0.93% 
108 312 2.9 
Way in which 
members were 
included in 
product design 
(Inclusiveness) 
82 
76.64% 
15 
14.02% 
10 
9.35% 
107 286 2.7 
Selection of 
members in 
assessment 
process 
94 
86.24% 
8 
7.34% 
7 
6.42% 
109 305 2.8 
Grievance 
Redress 
Mechanism 
84 
77.78% 
8 
7.41% 
16 
14.81% 
108 284 2.6 
